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The energy production sector is one of the main polluters in the world and thus plays a 
significant role in emission reductions and climate change mitigation. All the time more 
renewable energy production is needed to replace fossil fuel power plants. However, 
renewable energy is still in the most cases more expensive than conventional energy 
production and thus has to be supported financially in order to reach the renewable energy 
targets and a more environmentally friendly energy sector.  
 
This master’s thesis discusses renewable energy auctions and the role of small actors in 
them. Renewable energy auctions are a renewable energy support method, which is in use 
in an increasing number of countries in the world. These auctions set the remuneration 
level offered for renewable energy producers competitively, that is only the producers 
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develop the technologies in order to reduce costs and therefore increase the possibilities to 
be successful in the auctions. The advantage of this support method is its feature of driving 
down the costs caused by renewable subsidies to the society.  
 
Because of the competitive characteristics of the renewable energy auctions, small actors 
often have disadvantages in this support method as they are not able to offer renewable 
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Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Brazil, in order to find the best practices 
to enable small actor participation in renewable energy auctions. Also a short overview on 
other sectors’ auctions and small actors is conducted. 
 
The most important identified factors enhancing small actor participation in the auctions 
are auction design simplicity, technology choice (solar photovoltaic is the most suitable 
technology), low financial requirements and risks, low work load prior to the auctions and 
price-only evaluation. Other sectors’ auctions show that also some exception rules for 
small actors are possible when carefully designed.  
 
 
Keywords renewable energy support, feed-in tariff, competitive tariff setting, actor 
diversity, cost efficiency, auction design, acceptability 
  
 Aalto-yliopisto, PL 11000, 00076 AALTO 
www.aalto.fi 
Diplomityön tiivistelmä 
 
 III 
 
Tekijä Jenni Lairila 
Työn nimi Pienten toimijoiden rooli uusiutuvan energian huutokaupoissa 
Koulutusohjelma Energia- ja LVI-tekniikka 
Pää-/sivuaine Energiatekniikka Koodi K3007 
Työn valvoja Professori Sanna Syri 
Työn ohjaaja(t) M.Sc. Marijke Welisch 
Päivämäärä 12.05.2016 Sivumäärä 72 Kieli englanti 
Tiivistelmä 
Energiantuotantosektori on yksi suurimmista ilmaston saastuttajista ja siksi ratkaisevassa 
asemassa päästöjen vähentämisessä ja ilmastonmuutoksen hillitsemisessä. Uusiutuvan 
energian tuotantoa tarvitaan yhä enemmän korvaamaan fossiilisilla energianlähteillä 
toimivia voimalaitoksia. Uusiutuva energia on kuitenkin yhä edelleen usein kalliimpaa 
kuin uusiutumaton energia ja sen takia tarvitsee rahallista tukea, jotta uusiutuvan energian 
lisäystavoitteet saavutetaan ja energiasektori muuttuu ympäristöystävällisemmäksi. 
 
Tämä diplomityö tarkastelee uusiutuvan energian huutokauppoja ja pienten toimijoiden 
roolia. Uusiutuvan energian huutokauppa on uusiutuvan energian tukimuoto, jota 
käytetään yhä useammassa maassa. Huutokauppa asettaa uusiutuvalle energialle tarjotun 
tuen määrän kilpailun avulla, eli vain tuottajat, jotka voittavat huutokaupan, saavat tuen. 
Tämä vaatii tuottajia kehittämään teknologiaa saavuttaakseen matalammat kustannukset 
ja näin paremmat voittomahdollisuudet huutokaupassa. Tämän tukimuodon etu on sen 
kyky ajaa uusiutuvasta energiasta yhteiskunnalle aiheutuvia tukikustannuksia alas.  
 
Huutokaupan kilpailuhenkisyys saattaa kuitenkin usein pienet toimijat huonompaan 
asemaan, koska ne eivät pysty tarjoamaan yhtä edullisia projekteja kuin suuret toimijat. 
Jos tätä ei oteta huomioon huutokauppaa suunnitellessa, saattavat pienet toimijat kadota 
uusiutuvan energian markkinoilta. Tämä diplomityö analysoi uusiutuvan energian 
huutokauppoja viidessä maassa, Saksassa, Tanskassa, Ranskassa, Alankomaissa ja 
Brasiliassa, jotta parhaat tavat pienten toimijoiden kannustamiseen huutokauppoihin 
osallistumisessa voitaisiin tunnistaa. Lisäksi lyhyt katsaus muiden sektoreiden 
huutokauppoihin ja pieniin toimijoihin tuo lisää näkökulmaa aiheeseen. 
 
Tärkeimmät tunnistetut tekijät, jotka auttavat pieniä toimijoita huutokauppaan 
osallistumisessa, ovat huutokaupan sääntöjen yksinkertaisuus, aurinkokennot 
teknologiana, pienet taloudelliset vaatimukset ja riskit, pieni työpanos ennen 
huutokauppaa ja tarjouksen hinta ainoana arvostelukriteerinä. Muiden sektoreiden 
tarkastelu paljastaa, että joissain tapauksissa myös poikkeussääntöjen luominen pienille 
toimijoille on kannattavaa, kun ne suunnitellaan huolella.  
 
Avainsanat uusituvan energian tuki, syöttötariffi, tariffin asettaminen kilpailulla, 
toimijoiden moninaisuus, kustannustehokkuus, huutokaupan design, hyväksyttävyys 
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1 Introduction 
During the last decades it has become clear that in order to reduce the negative effects of 
climate change, it is crucial to increase the amount of renewable energy sources in energy 
production. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated in its reports 
about climate change, and especially in the newest Synthesis Report (2014), that the changes 
in the climate and its warming over the last decades is inevitably happening and it is not a 
natural change. The data from over the last one hundred years show an increase of 0,85 °C 
in the average land and ocean surface temperature from the year 1880 to the year 2012. The 
reason for the temperature increase is the higher percentage of greenhouse gases (especially 
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide) in the atmosphere. The experts agree widely that 
at least a (relatively large) part of the global warming is caused by human actions. Therefore, 
reverse human actions can also limit the further climate change – indeed, the IPCC goal is 
to keep the global warming in maximum 2 °C of the pre-industrialization level. This way the 
already identified negative effects of climate change, such as extreme weather phenomena, 
heat waves, ice melting in the Arctic regions and higher precipitation, can be limited to 
minimum. (IPCC, 2014) 
 
The energy sector is one of the largest emission producers in the world and thus one of the 
most important sectors to increase its climate-friendliness to slow down the climate change. 
According to International Energy Agency (IEA), energy production and use covers two 
thirds of all the greenhouse gas emissions in the world. Thus, it is clear that it is crucial for 
the energy sector to reduce its emissions in order to reach the climate goals. IEA has defined 
measures to cut down the emissions of energy production. The measures include phasing out 
least-efficient coal-fired power plants, stopping fossil-fuel subsidies and increasing 
significantly investments made on renewable energy. As can clearly be seen from the 
measures, renewable energy plays a critical role in reducing the effect of climate change. 
(IEA, 2015) 
 
IPCC (2011) has defined renewable energy as “any form of energy from solar, geophysical 
or biological sources that is replenished by natural processes at a rate that equals or exceeds 
its rate of use”. The most used and known renewable energy sources are biomass, solar 
energy, wind energy, geothermal energy, hydro power, tide and waves and ocean thermal 
energy. Some of the mentioned renewable energy sources are not automatically renewable, 
but the classification depends on the usage rate – it is for example possible to use biomass 
(e.g. wood) more than the growing rate is. Renewable energy sources as such have also either 
zero (e.g. hydro and solar) or neutral (e.g. biomass, where the emissions emitted by using 
biomass as a fuel are absorbed in the growing biomass) greenhouse gas emissions when not 
taking into account the equipment needed to harness the energy. (IPCC, 2011) 
 
Most of the projects that base on renewable energy sources, however, have high initial 
investment costs, partly because of their novelty, and can therefore not compete with 
conventional power plants with prices. This makes many renewable energy sources 
economically unfeasible as such, without well-planned support mechanisms. Thus, 
governments in many countries have implemented one or more systems to create incentives 
for renewable energy projects. (Sawin, 2004; Kylili & Fokaides, 2015) The most-used direct 
 2 
 
renewable support systems are feed-in tariffs or premiums, tradable green certificates and 
competitive tariff setting mechanisms, i.e. auctions (Kylili & Fokaides, 2015; del Río & 
Linares, 2014). Also investment support methods like tax incentives, investment grants or 
low-interest loans are used to support renewable energy (Sawin, 2004).  
 
Feed-in tariffs or premiums guarantee a sufficient electricity price for renewable energy 
producers to be able to cover the investment costs. Feed-in tariff sets a fixed price the 
producer is paid per produced electricity unit and feed-in premium is a premium paid 
additionally on the top of the market price. Both have normally a fixed contract period during 
which the tariff or premium is paid, and different technologies have different feed-in 
amounts. (Sawin, 2004) The feed-in systems, when designed and implemented properly, 
have proven to be a good incentive for a fast increase of renewable energy. It also encourages 
to build many different kind of renewable technologies, including the more expensive or 
immature technologies, as all the technologies have a support amount suitable for that exact 
technology. However, too high remuneration level is possible to occur in feed-in systems, 
causing unnecessary costs to the society and not incentivising the producers to develop the 
most efficient systems. (Hirvonen et al., 2015) 
 
Under tradable green certificate systems, the government obliges the energy suppliers to 
produce a certain percentage of their energy production with renewable energy sources. The 
suppliers obtain so-called green certificates according to the required amount. If a supplier 
has more renewable energy production than entitled, the extra certificates can be sold, and 
accordingly, a supplier not complying the required amount can buy these certificates. (Casisi 
et al., 2015) The certificate price is normally determined by the market, but the government 
can also set a maximum or minimum price. With a tradable green certificate system, the 
costs for society are likely to be lower than with feed-in systems, as the market decides the 
price. However, the government deciding the obligated percentage of renewable energy 
might also limit the renewable energy increase, if the percentage is set too low when 
considering the country’s renewable potential. It also tends to prefer the cheaper renewable 
technologies, as the certificate price is the same for all different technologies. (Sawin, 2004)  
 
Investment supports for renewable energy help the producers in the beginning of the 
renewable energy project. The government can support the initial investment for example 
by a direct grant to the producer to cover some of the initial costs, offer tax reliefs or lower 
the interest rate of the investment loan. (Sawin, 2004) However, the investment support 
methods do not create an incentive to the suppliers to produce as much energy as they can 
with the renewables, and additionally cause large expenses at a certain time to the 
government, as the whole support is paid at once. Therefore, production based support 
methods are in many countries nowadays preferred. (Hirvonen et al., 2015) 
 
Renewable energy auctions are a relatively new renewable support method. In this method, 
the support price is set competitively by an auction, in which the market actors, who want to 
produce renewable energy, can take part. This way the support level is determined by the 
market. Most of the other renewable support methods involve government or other 
regulatory body decision on the support price needed. (Sawin, 2004) However, the regulatory 
body is not an active market player, and thus does not know the costs and profits of 
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renewable energy production as accurately as the actual market players. This might lead to 
either very high renewable support costs, which in the end fall to the society, either to the 
tax payers or to the electricity consumers, or too low support, in which case not enough new 
renewable capacity is built. As constantly more renewable energy should be implemented in 
order to limit the climate change, the renewable support costs rise inevitably. Therefore, it 
is necessary to look for support methods minimizing the costs and maximizing the 
efficiency. Renewable energy auctions, when designed carefully, would offer a solution to 
this problem. (del Río & Linares, 2014; Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014) 
 
European Union (EU) has defined in its Directive 2009/28/EC that it will have 20% of the 
energy consumption of the member countries produced with renewable energy sources by 
2020 (European Council, 2009). Additionally, the policy framework of the European 
Commission for the period from 2020 to 2030 sets the renewable energy target for 2030 to 
be at least 27% of the energy consumption (European Commission, 2014a). To be able to 
achieve these goals, all the member countries have to use support instruments for promoting 
renewable energy. EU will require, according to the Energy and Environment State Aid 
Guidelines of the European Commission, in order to unify the support mechanisms used in 
the member countries, that every member country takes renewable energy auctions as their 
support instrument at the latest in 2017. Some exceptions to this requirement are, however, 
allowed, for example to avoid rising support costs or not to exclude small actors from the 
markets. (European Commission, 2014b)  
 
Thus, renewable energy auctions are a relevant and actual topic in both global and European 
contexts. As already mentioned, EU member countries, when implementing auctions, are 
allowed to make an exception with small actors. From this, it can be concluded that there 
might be some problems with small actor participation in the auctions. Indeed, as auction is 
a competitive procedure, large actors, for example international companies, are able to use 
their economies-of-scale effect to influence the prices, an advantage that small actors do not 
have, and thus small actors might therefore easily be discriminated in the auctions (del Río 
& Linares, 2014; Sawin, 2004). This master’s thesis researches the role of small actors in 
renewable energy auctions. The goal is to find out the best practices to attract small actors 
to participate in the renewable energy auctions and to enable them to bid successfully. 
However, this thesis does not concentrate on the options of excepting small actors from the 
auctions as a whole and offering them some alternative support methods. The research is 
conducted by a literature review over five countries, Germany, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands and Brazil, which have implemented renewable energy auctions, and an 
extensive qualitative analysis on the outcomes of the literature review. The analysis 
compares the design of the renewable auctions in the five countries, finds common elements 
and features to promote small actors and discusses the found features in the renewable energy 
market structure context of each country. Additionally, a short review on auctions in other 
sectors than renewable energy is conducted and the methods for small actor participation 
enhancement analysed. By these means, this thesis finds the best practices for small actor 
promotion in the renewable energy auctions based on the experiences of the five countries.  
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. After this introduction, the second chapter presents 
renewable energy auctions, describes them in detail and gives a short overview of auction 
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theory. Chapter 3 discusses the problems and advantages of small actor inclusion in the 
auctions, presents ways to define a small actor and shortly describes the small actor support 
possibilities if they are excluded from the auctions. In chapter 4, the literature reviews of 
Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Brazil is conducted. The literature reviews 
discuss the general renewable energy situation in each country, the implementation features 
of the renewable energy auctions, how small actors are taken into account in the auctions 
and if the auctions have been attractive to them and also offered possibilities to win for small 
actors. The fifth chapter compares the experiences and the sixth chapter presents 
perspectives to the topic from other sectors’ auctions. Finally, chapter 7 concludes the thesis.  
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2 Renewable energy auctions 
2.1 Introduction to renewable energy auctions 
Renewable energy auctions are a renewable energy support mechanism, which base on the 
idea of regulatory body deciding the necessary or wanted renewable capacity increase and 
the market to decide the price for the demanded increase. Ideally, this system would mirror 
the real costs of renewable energy production and thus cause the minimum support costs for 
the society. Auction process also releases the regulatory body from trying to estimate the 
real costs of renewable energy projects and instead lets the project developers, who know 
the costs best, decide the costs and thus the support levels. (Kylili & Fokaides, 2015) Auction 
process can also be called as bidding or tendering process (del Río & Linares, 2014) and 
therefore the three terms are used in this thesis interchangeably.  
 
To start a renewable energy auction, regulatory body publishes a call for tenders. In the call 
for example the rules, agreement conditions, capacity available for tendering and other 
necessary terms are defined. After the call for tenders, producers or suppliers are allowed to 
submit their tenders. In theory, all possible actors from small co-operatives to large, 
international companies can bid with their offer(s). The bid price is the amount of support 
with which the bidder can realize the project. The support is normally in terms of price per 
capacity unit or per produced energy unit, thus being basically a type of feed-in tariff, just 
the amount of the tariff is decided by the market. (Kylili & Fokaides, 2015; Fraunhofer ISI 
et al., 2014) 
 
After the tenders are submitted, the auctioneer, i.e. the regulatory body, organises the bids 
in the order of increasing price. The bids, starting from the lowest price, are awarded the 
rights to realise the projects and get the bid support, until the desired volume (or in some 
cases the price limit) is reached. The rest of the bids are neglected. The support will be 
contracted for the winning bids for a certain period of time (normally relatively long time, 
e.g. 10-20 years). In the most cases, the support level defined in the auction, i.e. the price 
that the producer receives from the regulatory body, is the price difference between the 
higher, in the auction fixed support level and the lower, electricity market spot price. (Sawin, 
2004; Kylili & Fokaides, 2015) 
 
The presented flow of the auction is a general, simplified model to understand the principle 
of the renewable energy auctions. However, the real, detailed flow of an auction can vary a 
lot from country to country and even inside a country from auction to auction. This is because 
of the large amount of auction design elements and their many possible ways of design. (del 
Río & Linares, 2014) The design elements and their effect on the auctions are explained 
more in detail in the subchapter 2.3 Auction design elements. 
 
By setting up the auction and deciding the desired capacity increase, the regulatory body or 
the state’s government usually has a long-time target for renewable energy capacity. This, 
indeed, is one of the main drivers for implementing auctions as a renewable energy support 
method. When the government can decide the auctioned volumes of renewable capacities, it 
is easy, in theory, to achieve the renewable targets in the decided or given time frame. 
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(Sawin, 2004) As the projects and developers have to compete with each other, they have 
the pressure to reveal the real costs of producing energy with a specific renewable energy 
source, thus minimizing the unnecessary or too high profits. Thus, the main goal of the 
auctions is to reach the desired renewable capacity level with the minimum costs to the 
society. (Kylili & Fokaides, 2015) 
 
Renewable energy auctions have already been implemented in a number of countries, and 
therefore there are already some experiences of the functioning of the auctions. Some 
experiences in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s from auctions that can be described as failed, 
in sense of cost-efficiency and the ability to implement new renewable energy projects, have 
been ruling the opinions about renewable energy auctions for some years. However, in the 
recent years, a lot of studies have been carried out proving auctions not automatically as a 
non-functioning instrument to promote renewable energy, but rather being very sensitive to 
its design affecting the outcome. (del Río & Linares, 2014) Indeed, the number of countries 
which have implemented renewable energy auctions has risen from 9 in 2009 to 44 in 2013, 
showing a rapid increase in the popularity of the auctions. Thus, the auctions and their 
possible success in implementing new renewable energy should be considered as a support 
method among the other successful ones. (IRENA, 2013) 
 
2.2 Auction theory 
To be able to understand the auction mechanisms in general and apply the principles to the 
renewable energy auctions, a short overview of auction theory is presented in this chapter. 
All the theories explained in this chapter are theories for regular auctions, where there is one 
seller, the auctioneer, and many buyers, the bidders, and the seller wants to achieve the 
highest possible price for the item auctioned. However, renewable energy auctions are 
reverse to this procedure and called procurement auctions. In procurement auctions there is 
only one buyer, which is the auctioneer, and many sellers, who are the bidders. The buyer 
wants to buy the auctioned item with the lowest possible price. All the regular auction 
theories apply to the procurement auctions as well, only reversely. (Ausubel, 2008; 
Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014)  
 
The simplest auction format is an auction, where a single item is auctioned and the winner 
is the bidder who value the item the most, i.e. bids the highest price. The winner and the 
according price can be determined in single-item auctions either by a closed auction format 
(sealed-bid auctions) or open auction method (dynamic auctions). In case of sealed-bid 
auctions, the price can be determined with a first-price or second-price rule. When applying 
sealed-bid auctions, the bidders submit their bids to the auctioneer without any information 
about the bids of the other bidders. After the bids are submitted, the auctioneer announces 
the winner bid. If first-price rule is applied, the bidder pays the price he bid, and in case of 
second-price rule, the price of the second-highest bid. (Ausubel 2008) Open auctions can 
have various formats. The most-known formats are open ascending and open descending 
auctions. Open ascending auction is the traditional auction, where the auctioneer calls a low 
start price, and the bidders announce their interest. The auctioneer starts to raise the price 
until there is only one bidder interested in the item. The last bidder wins and buys the item 
on the last round’s price. (Krishna, 2002) The open ascending auction can be organised also 
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in the way that the auctioneer does not increase the price but the bidders submit every round 
successively higher bids (Ausubel, 2008). In open descending auction the auctioneer calls 
first a very high price, with which no bidder is interested to buy the item. The auctioneer 
lowers the price until one bidder shows interest, and the bidder buys the item with that price. 
(Krishna, 2002) 
 
In many cases nowadays, however, the auctions are applied in situations where not only a 
single item is auctioned at a time but a certain amount of a good or many similar, but not 
identical goods are auctioned at the same time, probably allowing many bidders to be 
winners. Therefore, multi-item auctions and their theory are of a great importance. When the 
goods to be auctioned are possible to divide in parts in as large units as wanted, theory of 
auctions of homogeneous goods can be applied. Also here sealed-bid and open auction 
formats exist. The bidders submit in addition to the price they are willing to pay also the 
amount they want to buy with the price. In sealed-bid homogeneous goods auctions, the bids 
are organized as in single-item auctions, and the bidders with highest bids, until the 
auctioned volume is satisfied, are the winners. The price can be defined three ways: pay-as-
bid, uniform or Vickrey pricing. With pay-as-bid method, the winners pay the price they bid, 
in uniform pricing every bidder pays the price of the lowest bid and in Vickrey auctions all 
the bidders pay the price of the first not-winning bid. (Ausubel, 2008; Krishna, 2002) 
 
The open auction version of multi-item auctions is a so-called clock auction. The auctioneer 
starts either with a high or a low price and decreases or increases the price, respectively. The 
bidders submit each round their bids with the bid amount and price. The winners are in 
ascending clock auctions the ones who remain after the auctioneer has increased the price 
until there is no excess quantity bid, and the winners pay the price of that round. In 
descending clock auction the auctioneer lowers the price until there are enough bids to satisfy 
the auctioned quantity. A non-uniform version of dynamic homogeneous multi-item auction 
is Ausubel auction, where a bidder can be awarded to win already before the auction is over. 
If the amount bid by the rest of the bidders is less than the total auctioned quantity at an 
ascending clock auction round, the bidder whose bid exceeds the auctioned quantity gets the 
difference between the auctioned quantity and the amount bid by others already at that round, 
with the price of that round. On other means the auction is held as a normal clock auction. 
(Ausubel, 2008; Krishna, 2002) 
 
When the goods auctioned cannot be divided the way as in homogeneous goods auctions, 
but all the goods have their own features, the multi-item heterogeneous goods auction theory 
applies. There are also various ways to organize heterogeneous goods auctions. (Ausubel, 
2008) In simultaneous ascending auctions the bidders submit their bids, where they give 
their price for each item auctioned. The auctioneer defines a standing price for each item, 
and on the next round the bidders must bid higher than the standing price. The auction ends 
when no new bids are submitted and the last bidders with the newest standing prices buy the 
items with those prices. (Milgrom, 2004) However, there might be some synergies between 
the auctioned items, for example that some bidder might value getting two of the items higher 
than the sum of each single item, or vice versa. In this case the items are so-called 
complements to each other, instead of being substitutes to each other. An auction format 
taking this into account is static pay-as-bid combinatorial auction. In this auction format the 
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bidders are allowed to submit bids also with packages, i.e. price for many items at the same 
time, not obligating them to buy only a single item. Another version of the combinatorial 
auctions is Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction, where the winning bidders pay according to the 
more value they bring by taking part to the auctions. (Ausubel, 2008) 
 
Some similarities can be found between the different auction formats. When considering 
bidder strategies in single-item auctions, sealed-bid first-price auctions and open descending 
auctions are similar. In both, the bidder has to decide prior to the auction how much he values 
the item. Unlike in the other dynamic auction, open ascending auction, in descending auction 
the bidders do not receive any information of other bidders’ behaviour, and will thus 
strategically bid only when the price announced by the auctioneer equals to the price he prior 
to the auction decided. When the first bidder shows his interest, the auction is over and the 
other bidders will not have a chance to bid after learning from other bidders’ behaviour. This 
similarity in bidder strategies suggests the auction outcome to be the same in the two auction 
models. Also single-item sealed-bid second-price and open ascending auctions have 
similarities, though not as strong, in bidder strategies. Accordingly, in homogeneous multi-
item auctions corresponding relations can be found: descending clock auction corresponds 
to pay-as-bid auction, ascending clock to uniform price and Ausubel auction to Vickrey 
auction. (Krishna, 2008) 
 
There are also relations between the theories for single-item, multi-item homogeneous goods 
and multi-item heterogeneous goods auctions. When pay-as-bid or descending clock auction 
is reduced to single-unit model, it reduces to first-price or open descending auction. 
Respectively, Vickrey or Ausubel auction can be reduced to second-price or open ascending 
auction. (Krishna, 2002) Vickrey-Clarke-Groves is a multi-unit heterogeneous goods 
auction version of the Vickrey auction of homogeneous goods, and thus also theoretically 
related to the single-unit second-price auction. (Ausubel, 2008) As can be seen, there are a 
lot of different auction designs for different situations. Therefore, when designing the 
renewable energy auctions, many factors have to be taken into account. More detailed design 
options for renewable energy auctions are presented in the next subchapter.   
 
2.3 Auction design elements 
As stated earlier, the detailed auction design can vary a lot. This is due to many design 
elements affecting the auctions. The design of these elements is very crucial for the auction 
outcome. If the design is not carefully considered, the auctions might work inefficiently, 
cause unwanted costs, increase instead of decreasing the support prices, decrease social 
acceptability of renewables and have other negative effects. When designed carefully, 
auctions can reach the target of adding the desired amount of renewable energy capacity with 
the lowest costs possible. (del Río & Linares, 2014) In this section, the main design elements 
are presented. Also their effects on the auction process are discussed.  
 
2.3.1 Auction mechanism 
There are several ways to decide the winner(s) of the auction, as presented in the previous 
subchapter Auction theory. Renewable energy auctions are in the most cases multi-unit 
homogeneous goods auctions, and thus those theories usually apply. The most used auction 
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mechanisms for renewable energy are sealed-bid auction, with either pay-as-bid, uniform 
price or Vickrey auction pricing rule, and descending clock auction. (Rego & Parente, 2013) 
As stated before, renewable energy auctions are procurement auctions, and thus reverse to 
the auction theories presented above. Sealed-bid renewable energy auction functions 
basically exactly the way the regular sealed-bid multi-unit auction, but there is only one 
buyer (the auctioneer) and multiple sellers (the bidders). The bidders submit their bids with 
a price they want to receive from the auctioneer to realise their projects. As the auctioneer, 
naturally, wants to have minimum costs, the lowest bids are chosen and awarded to win. A 
descending clock auction as a procurement auction is actually a reverse version of a regular 
ascending clock auction: in the case of renewable energy auctions, the auctioneer announces 
a high support price to attract the interest of many bidders, and each round the price is 
reduced until the required quantity or in some cases budget is met. (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 
2014) 
 
Both auction mechanisms have their advantages and disadvantages. Sealed-bid auction has 
the advantage of being simple, thus lowering both the administrative costs related to 
auctioning and bidding costs for bidders, and according to some studies attracting more bids 
than open auction. When more bids compete in the auction, the hard competition incentivises 
the bidders to bid lower. Vice versa, a low level of competition is likely to increase the bid 
prices and thus cause problems with cost-efficiency, one of the main goals of the auctions. 
(Rego & Parente, 2013) On the other side, however, the static structure of the sealed-bid 
auction does not let the bidders to react to the behaviour of other bidders because the bids 
are submitted simultaneously. This can lead to a so-called winner’s curse, where the winner 
feels it has valued the price too low. The descending clock auction addresses this problem 
by informing the bidders between the rounds about the outcomes, so that the bidders can 
adjust their offers in relation to the other bids, this way lowering the overall prices. 
(Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014) However, descending clock auctions are more likely to 
encounter strategic or collusive bidding than sealed-bid auctions. By strategic or collusive 
bidding the bidders keep intentionally the bid prices higher than the real costs, thus 
increasing the final support costs. (Rego & Parente, 2013) 
 
There are also hybrid models of the auction mechanisms. The most common of them is a 
model, where the first phase is a descending clock auction to allow price discovery for the 
bidders, and the second phase is a sealed-bid auction, where the bidders submit their final 
bids. In the final bids the bid price cannot be higher than the price determined in the last 
round of the descending clock phase. (del Río & Linares, 2014) This hybrid design addresses 
the disadvantages of the both sealed-bid and descending clock auctions by letting the bidders 
react to their competitors’ bids in the first phase, thus lowering the winner’s curse, and 
avoiding collusive or strategic behaviour in the second phase. It has also been stated that the 
hybrid model attracts more and also smaller bidders, increasing the competition, which is 
crucial for a cost-efficient auction outcome. (Rego & Parente, 2013) 
 
2.3.2 Auctioned product 
The auctioned product can be either capacity payments (€/MW/year) or payments related to 
produced energy (€/MWh). The capacity payments are actually similar to an investment 
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grant, just divided over years. As capacity is the most used measure for power plant size, 
capacity payments have the advantage of being clear and simple for everyone. When the 
payments are in terms of capacity, however, it does not create any pressure for the power 
plant to actually be available and produce as much as possible. (Klessmann et al., 2015b) 
When the payments are in terms of produced energy, the plant is likely to use its maximum 
possible availability, and additionally it is easier to manage the power grid. As a 
disadvantage for payments for produced energy is the difficulty and thus extra risk for 
bidders to estimate as exactly as possible the average availability and stay on that plan during 
the years. (del Río et al., 2015) 
 
2.3.3 Auctioned quantity 
The capacity auctioned on a tendering round is usually in accordance with the longer-time 
goals for renewable energy capacity increase for the auctioning country. Ideally, the 
regulatory body plans the auctions and quantities auctioned each round so that in the end of 
a target period the long-time target is achieved, supposing that the auctions function as 
planned and the winner bid projects are realised. (del Río et al., 2015) 
 
However, the experiences of already implemented renewable energy auctions show clearly 
that there are practically always winning bidders whose projects will not be realised. This is 
mainly due to strategic bidding, where the (often not serious) bidders submit too low bids in 
order to win the auction for example for strategic reasons. As the bid is too low, it is not 
feasible to actually realise the project with the awarded price, and the project is delayed or 
not realised at all. (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014) Other reasons for projects not being realised 
can be for example unforeseen problems during the constructing phase or too optimistic 
estimation of future cost decreases. There are design elements to address this problem, for 
example prequalification criteria for auction participants, financial guarantees and penalties 
for delay or non-compliance. (Klessmann et al., 2015b) These are all discussed more in detail 
in the related subchapters.  
 
Because of a certain non-realisation rate of the projects in the auctions, the auctioneer has to 
take this into account when deciding how much quantity is auctioned. This excess quantity 
in contrast to the real, desired capacity increase has, however, some problems. The amount 
of necessary excess quantity is very hard to estimate, as the realisation rate depends on many 
design elements and other factors. To be able to estimate the excess quantity needed as 
accurately as possible, it would need many auctions to gather experience and iterate the right 
amount from those. Also a political problem of auctioned capacity differing from the 
targeted capacity expansion is faced: How to justify the seemingly difference between these 
amounts? (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014) 
 
There is also a possibility not to auction quantity at all, but to decide a budget for the auction 
and to award winners until the budget is exhausted. This solution ensures for the regulatory 
body how high the overall support costs will be and therefore makes the budgeting simpler 
for the government.  The support costs known beforehand simplify the allocation of the costs 
for example to the electricity consumers or other necessary stakeholders as well. (del Río & 
Linares, 2014; del Río et al., 2015) 
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2.3.4 Auction frequency 
Auctions should be organszed on a regularly basis, according to the country’s plan of 
renewable energy implementation targets (Klessmann et al., 2015a). Some early experiences 
show that unpredictable timetable of the auctions is likely to cause stop-and-go behaviour 
for the (domestic) manufacturers and decrease the incentives for development of renewable 
energy technologies. (Agnolucci, 2007) The reason for this is the uncertainness, as the actors 
cannot know when the regulatory body will have the auction next time and if it is profitable 
to continue manufacturing and developing as the they cannot be sure when their products 
will next time be needed. (Klessmann et al., 2015a)  
 
When it assured that the tendering rounds are organised regularly and that the possible 
bidders are aware of the regularity and can trust on it, remains the question of how often it 
is feasible to call for tenders. The specific technology affects, naturally, the decision of how 
often the auctions are held: the average project realisation times are different for different 
technologies, for example for wind and solar power. Generally, if the rounds are held often, 
it is more convenient for the bidders: if they fail in one auction, they will have the chance to 
win on the next round inside a small time frame. Often held auctions also avoid the stop-
and-go problem, as there are almost continuously new projects needing the equipment from 
the manufacturers. When the auction take place often, it is also easier and quicker to learn 
from auction outcomes and possible to do corrections to the procedure. However, often held 
auctions increase the administrative costs and decrease the participant number in each round, 
lowering the competition level. (del Río & Linares, 2014; Klessmann et al., 2015a)  
 
Decreasing the auction round number per time unit allows more participants per round, thus 
increasing the for auctions essential competition. This way the possible collusive or strategic 
behaviour is also decreased. As there are fewer rounds per time unit, the administrative costs 
become automatically lower. On the other side, seldom held auctions can cause stop-and-go 
behaviour among the manufacturers. This is especially critical for the domestic actors in 
renewable energy business. As both the often and seldom held tendering rounds have their 
advantages and disadvantages, it important to find a suitable regularity that minimises the 
problems related to this issue. (del Río et al., 2015; Klessmann et al., 2015b) 
 
2.3.5 Contract duration 
It is widely agreed that the contract duration and thus the remuneration period for the winner 
bids should be relatively long. Depending on the technology, it could be for example 10 to 
20 years. Securing long support period for the winner projects gives an easier access to the 
finances for the bidders. This normally reduces the bid prices, thus resulting in a more cost-
efficient auction outcome. (del Río & Linares, 2014) However, significantly too long support 
periods might lead to high costs to the society, as the support has to be paid over a long time. 
Thus, technology-specific, relatively but reasonably long support periods should be 
considered. (del Río et al., 2015) 
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2.3.6 Prequalification criteria 
As already described in the section 2.2.3 Auctioned quantity, there is always a certain non-
realisation rate among the winner projects. As it is beneficial to get as high realisation rates 
as possible to increase the amount of renewable power efficiently, instruments to address the 
non-realisation problems are required. Prequalification criteria for the bidders is one 
relatively efficient way of ensuring the seriousness of the bidders. Typically, prequalification 
criteria demand the bidders to have certain, first-phase steps of a project to be already 
realised when submitting the bid. For example, site permits, grid access, proofs of healthy 
economic state of the actor or financial deposits can be included in the prequalification 
criteria. Only the bids fulfilling the criteria will be evaluated and thus able to win the auction. 
(Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014; Klessmann et al., 2015b) Prequalification criteria also at least 
partly defines at which state of the project the bidders can attend the auctions. If many and 
strict prequalification criteria are required, the project is already in a more developed state 
when entering the auction than if only few or no prequalification criteria are required. 
(Klessmann et al., 2015a) 
 
When prequalification criteria are required from the bidders, the bidders must already prior 
to the actual auction have carried out some crucial project steps. As the steps in the most 
cases require financial investments or at least work load from the bidder, the criteria prevent 
unserious, strategic bidders with intentionally low bids and no realization intentions, because 
the costs used for fulfilling prequalification criteria are on the time of the auction already 
sunk costs and cannot be received back. (del Río et al., 2015) In addition, as the bidder 
already gains some more information and knowledge about the project by carrying out the 
pre-phases, the bidder has a greater possibility to know the real project costs and bid 
according to these. The project is also possible to be realised in a shorter time after the 
auction than in an auction design without any pre-phases required to be carried out before 
bidding. However, strict prequalification criteria tend to attract less bidders, because, as 
mentioned, the costs prior to the auction are already sunk costs after the auction and in case 
of losing the auction the bidder will not get the money back. This risk has to be known by 
the regulatory body when defining the prequalification criteria to assure sufficient 
competition. Confirming the prequalification criteria of the bidders also causes additional 
administrative costs to the regulatory body. (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014; Klessmann et al., 
2015b) 
 
2.3.7 Minimum number of bidders or bidder concentration 
In the most cases it is necessary to have some rules considering the bidder number or 
concentration when awarding the winning bids. If no rules are applied, one single bidder or 
only a few large actors might be awarded the contract with a relatively high price. A 
minimum number of bidders explicitly expresses the minimum number of different actors 
whose projects will be awarded, even though the bid(s) from only one actor would be at the 
lowest cost and sufficient to fulfil the tendered quantity. Bidder concentration limits define 
for example a maximum percentage that one actor can be awarded from the auctioned 
quantity. If the auction attracts so few bidders that the minimum number or concentration 
rules are not satisfied, the regulatory body may cancel the auction (del Río & Linares, 2014). 
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2.3.8 Price limits 
It is possible to set a maximum or minimum price for the auction. That defines the 
restrictions of how high or low bids are qualified to be awarded. Setting a minimum price is 
a way of preventing underbidding and ensuring that the projects awarded are likely to be 
realised. Setting a maximum price allows the regulatory body to cap the auction costs to a 
certain amount and to prevent collusive behaviour of the bidders by not letting them bid 
strategically too high together. (del Río et al., 2015) Setting a maximum and/or minimum 
price for the bids, however, causes additional work for the regulatory body and forces it, 
against the initial auction logic of market knowing and deciding the actual price better, to 
consider the price of support needed and thus appropriate minimum or maximum limits. If 
the limits are chosen wrong, the auction outcome will not be the most cost-efficient one: 
when maximum price is known beforehand, the bidders tend to bid marginally close to that 
price, even if that would not be the real price. If the maximum price would not be announced 
to the bidders, it would decrease the transparency of the auction and increase the bidder risk. 
If the minimum price is set too high, the auction would not be an efficient instrument of 
discovering the real, most cost-efficient prices for renewables. (Klessmann et al., 2015a & 
b) A too high minimum price can also lead to regulatory body neglecting the price limit, if 
most of the bids fall under it, thus losing the whole target of setting a minimum price (Kylili 
& Fokaides, 2015). 
 
2.3.9 Banding 
Auctions can be organised for all the renewable technologies as one auction, where the 
different renewable technologies compete against each other, or by applying technology 
bands, i.e. having separate auctions for different technologies. One option is also to have the 
technologies in the same auction but reserving a certain percentage of the awarded bids for 
each technology. (Klessmann et al., 2015a; del Río & Linares, 2014) When banding is 
applied, it is more likely that the real costs of each technology are revealed. All the renewable 
technologies have for example different cost structure, market situation and project length. 
If all the technologies are considered in one auction (also without percentages for each 
technology), it is likely that the cheapest of the renewable energy technologies win the most 
quotas awarded, the more expensive technologies do not have the chances to win and thus 
not all the renewable potential of a country is used. (del Rio et al., 2015) Also in technology-
neutral auctions mature technologies usually overrun the immature technologies, and this 
way decrease the incentives to develop further the not yet mature but promising 
technologies. On the other hand, when banding different technologies to separate auctions 
or allocating a certain percentage to each technology, the competition level decreases as all 
the actors are divided into several tendering processes. Thus, when deciding the banding of 
the tenders, the regulatory body should be aware of the market situation in each technology 
field and assure the competition in each band to ensure an efficient auction outcome. (del 
Río & Linares, 2014) Using banding, however, seems an attractive option, as the optimal 
design of the different design elements differs from technology to technology, and by 
banding it is possible to use the optimal design for each technology and not to try to make a 
compromise satisfying all technologies to some degree (Klessmann et al., 2015a). 
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2.3.10 Geographical restrictions 
If the geographical locations of the bidders’ projects are not regulated or controlled, it 
logically leads to a lot of installed capacity in locations with the highest yields, for example 
for wind energy the windiest places. If all the renewable power production is concentrated 
in only few areas, problems with local acceptance, power grid limitations and producer 
surpluses may appear. If a lot of renewable power plants are built in the same region in a 
short time frame, local people easily start to object it because of the “not in my backyard”-
effect. When the renewable power is more distributed, the effect on each region is smaller 
and it is less likely to encounter negative attitudes towards renewables. Electricity grid 
capacity is also one important aspect when considering adding renewable energy: when 
building only in one region, the grid capacity limits will most likely be encountered and there 
will be grid congestions, not allowing the produced energy to be distributed to consumers 
efficiently. Producer surplus becomes a problem when there are projects awarded also in 
sites with not so high yields. In this situation, projects with profitable and not-so-profitable 
sites might get the same support, which is set by the worse site, and thus the better site project 
is paid too much support, lowering the cost-efficiency of the auction. (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 
2014) 
 
The problems related to free site selection of the bidders can be addressed by pre-selected 
sites by the regulatory body (acceptance and grid problems) or different support rates for 
sites with different yields (surplus problem) (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014). If the sites are pre-
selected or even different auctions held for different sites, it causes less competition and 
therefore might lead to less cost-efficient outcome. However, site specifications to some 
degree seem to be necessary. If sites are pre-selected, the transmission companies are easy 
to include with the site decision process, thus ensuring the grid capacity with the new 
renewable capacity, and sites are in that case also pre-approved by a permitting authority. 
This reduces the pre-auction costs for bidders, lowers the bidder risk and improves the 
possibility of also for example small actors to take part to the auctions. It also increases the 
realisation rate of the project, as one major initial project step is already taken. (del Río & 
Linares, 2014) 
 
2.3.11 Evaluation criteria 
The winners can be decided either only by the lowest price rule or with a multi-criteria 
evaluation. The multi-criteria evaluation might take into account also for example 
environmental, grid, actor variety, local acceptance and geographical issues and not only 
organise the bids in the order of the lowest price. If the only evaluation criterion is price, the 
other important aspects, such as environment and grid, can be included to pre-qualification 
criteria, which again causes an additional risk to the bidders by increasing the pre-auction 
costs. Price-based evaluation is, however, much more simple and transparent than multi-
criteria evaluation, as the rules are easily comprehended and there are no issues of for 
example trying to objectively evaluate rather abstract criteria like local acceptance. It is also 
more likely to achieve the most cost-efficient outcome with a price-based than multi-criteria 
evaluation. The other important issues, however, cannot be evaluated with the price-based 
evaluation but can only have for example maximum or minimum limits set by 
prequalification criteria, and thus the bidders will not have the incentive to reach for the 
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optimal solution in regard of the other, for example environmental, issues. (del Río et al., 
2015; Klessmann et al., 2015a & b) 
 
2.3.12 Deadlines 
In the most cases, it is beneficial to have a deadline after the auction is held to define the 
time in which the awarded projects have to be realised. A deadline makes sure that the 
projects are realised in a reasonable time frame and the increase in renewable power is 
implemented as planned. (del Río & Linares, 2014) If no deadline is set, it may attribute to 
a higher non-realisation rate as the bidders might wait too long time for lower prices due to 
expected price development (Agnolucci, 2007). When the deadline is set, it has to be 
considered carefully, how long period of project compliance is suitable for each type of 
renewable energy. If the period is short, it sets pressure to the bidders prior to the auction 
and thus increases the bidder risk. If the period is too long, it might let the bidders think too 
optimistically about future price reductions and thus bid too low. Therefore, it is important 
to set the deadline technology-specifically, as the different technologies have very varying 
average implementation times. (del Río et al., 2015) 
 
2.3.13 Penalties for non-compliance or delay 
As mentioned, auctions might have a problem of projects not being completed, when the 
auction design is not carefully considered. One efficient method to increase the realisation 
rate, in addition to deadlines and prequalification criteria, is setting penalties for non-
compliance or delay. When the bidders know prior to bidding that a penalty will be applied 
if the project is not realised, it sets an incentive for them not to bid strategically too low 
without a real intention to realise the project. (Klessmann et al., 2015b) The penalty can be 
either a payment which the bidder has to pay in case of delay or non-compliance or lowering 
(gradually) the contracted support in case of delay (del Rio & Linares, 2014). When applying 
the penalty payment, the bidders must normally submit a deposit or guarantee in order to 
ensure the paying of the penalty if the project is for example not completed because of 
economic problems of the bidder. As penalties are implemented as a part of the auction 
process, it should be taken into account that it is an additional economic risk for the bidders, 
and the risk will most likely be added to the bid price. Therefore, the amount of the penalty 
has to be considered carefully to still be a relatively small risk to the bidders but large enough 
an incentive to force the winning bids to be realised. (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014) A high 
penalty might also deter participation and especially reduce the attractiveness of the 
tendering process for small actors (del Río & Linares, 2014).  
 
The reason for non-compliance or delay of a project can be caused either by the bidder or by 
some external, not bidder-related factor. When all cases of non-compliance or delay are 
penalised, even if the reason is not caused by the bidder, the bidders might face a too high 
risk. Therefore, it can be reasonable to apply the penalties only in case of delay or non-
compliance is caused by the bidder. However, it is often not simple to distinguish clearly if 
a failure is caused by the bidder or some external reason. This might lead to unclear rules of 
the contract and therefore additional problems when deciding if the bidder should pay the 
penalty. Thus, some larger external risks could be included for example in the 
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prequalification criteria or pre-selection of the project sites and then implement an 
unconditional, simpler penalty. (del Río & Linares, 2014; Klessmann et al., 2015a)  
 
2.3.14 Secondary market for successful bids 
One way to decrease the bidder risk caused by penalties is to create a secondary market for 
winning projects. In this market, the winning bidders could have the possibility to give the 
project to another market actor and at the same time pass the support contracted and the 
obligation to build the project. Ideally, the secondary market would consist of all the market 
actors and thus lower the penalty risk of a single bidder. However, a secondary market 
increases the administrative work and costs and the complexity of the auctions. (Fraunhofer 
ISI et al., 2014) The cost-efficiency might also decrease, as some actors might not bid 
themselves but wait for the secondary market, thus reducing competition. One way of 
avoiding the complexity caused by secondary market but still decreasing the bidders’ penalty 
risk is to allow the winner bidders to change the project to be realised while keeping the 
same awarded support and obligations to realise the project. This reduces, however, the 
competitiveness of small actors as they do not have the same possibilities of a large 
production portfolio and thus changing the project as easily. (Klessmann et al., 2015b)   
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3 Small actors in renewable energy auctions 
3.1 Definition of a small actor  
Some of the biggest questions to be solved with the right design of renewable energy auction 
of their early implementations were to ensure enough competition to enable a functioning, 
non-collusive auction and to achieve high realisation rates (Agnolucci, 2007; Rego & 
Parente, 2013; del Río & Linares, 2014). However, another important question has risen and 
drawn attention all the time more in the recent past years: actor diversity in the renewable 
energy auctions. By actor diversity, participation of different-sized actors from different 
origins is meant. In a naturally competitive market all the market players from large, 
international companies to medium-sized domestic firms and small family businesses should 
have a chance to enter the market and practice the business fairly. The same applies for 
energy production markets. However, when a support instrument is implemented to promote 
some means of energy production, the completely free competitive market is violated. 
Therefore, it is important to take the actor diversity into account when implementing support 
methods. (Klessmann et al., 2015a) As this thesis discusses the role of small actors in 
renewable energy auctions, it is important to define a small actor. The definition, however, 
is not a simple task. If some special rules or advantages are applied only for small actors in 
the auctions, the definition must be unambiguous and in a legal context only one way 
interpretable. There are some varying ways for defining a small actor, and those ways are 
presented in this chapter. (Tiedemann et al., 2015) 
 
EU has a definition for small and medium-sized actors. This definition can be used also for 
renewable energy auctions. It defines the amount of employees and either the annual 
turnover or annual balance sheet total. According to this definition, micro-sized enterprises 
have less than 10 employees and a turnover or balance sheet total of maximum 2 million 
euros. Small-sized enterprises have less than 50 employees and a turnover or balance sheet 
total of maximum 10 million euros. Middle-sized enterprises have less than 250 employees 
and a turnover of maximum 50 million euros or a balance sheet total of maximum 43 million 
euros. (European Commission, 2003) If all the three classes of this definition should be 
considered as small actors in renewable energy auctions or only micro and/or small-sized 
enterprises, depends on the market situation in a certain country and technology field. Even 
though this EU definition is exact and rather simple to prove, some problems might still arise 
when applying this rule to renewable energy auctions. As one typical kind of small actors 
are citizen projects, which haven’t had any projects or business earlier, the turnover and/or 
balance sheet total cannot be verified for these actors. A further problem might arise if the 
project is for strategic reasons initiated by a small enterprise but after winning the bid 
transferred to another, larger company, if the auction design allows this. (Tiedemann et al., 
2015) 
 
Another possibility is to choose to define only from local citizens initiated cooperatives or 
companies as small actors. A report specialized in energy projects from local cooperatives 
defines these projects to be from local people and/or business or agricultural enterprises, 
excluding large companies, and these actors alone or together initiate a project so that at least 
50% of the votes stay within actors who live or come from the region where the project is 
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going to take place. (Hauser et al., 2015) This definition of small actors emphasises the 
locality of the actors and thus reinforces local acceptability of the renewable energy projects. 
However, the definition is easily misinterpreted and cannot be defined exactly enough for a 
legal context. This is likely to lead to problems with misuse of the status of a small actor. 
(Klessmann et al., 2015a)  
 
One possibility is also instead of defining the size of the actor to define the size of the project. 
When this definition is applied, it is assumed that small actors plan small projects. This 
definition is called De-minimis rule. When a maximum project size for a specific technology 
is defined, the rule is easy to understand by the bidders and to prove by the auctioneer. 
(Klessmann et al., 2015b) It is, however, clear that not only small actors can create small 
project, and if small projects would achieve advantages when applying this rule, it would be 
attracting also for large actors to plan small projects and the rule would lose its significance. 
It could also lead to less efficient auction income if the bidders would intentionally divide 
their projects into many smaller projects to achieve the advantages of De-minimis rule and 
thus lose the cost-efficiency of economies of scale. (Klessmann et al., 2015a) 
 
It can also be assumed that small actors have a lower participation frequency in the auctions 
than the larger ones. Therefore, the participation frequency can also be used as a definition 
for small actors. It should be, however, only used with the EU definition of a small actor (or 
similar criteria defining the size of the actor), otherwise the large actors have an incentive to 
take part to the auctions less frequently. It should also be considered, if the bidders exceeding 
the frequency limit should be excluded of the definition with all their projects or only with 
those projects exceeding the limit. A special case of participation frequency limit is to allow 
small actors once have advantages of the definition and from the next project of the same 
actor the normal auction rules would be applied. This would especially address projects of 
local cooperatives, who tend to create only one project for their own region, but on the other 
hand, set small project developer companies, who as well have difficulties to compete 
against large international ones, in a disadvantaged position. (Klessmann et al., 2015a) 
 
As can be seen, the definition of a small actor can be problematic and also dependant on the 
country and technology context. In this chapter in the following subchapters, the suitability 
of renewable energy auctions for the small actors, importance of small actors in the markets 
and possible optional ways for small actors when not being able to compete in auctions are 
not discussed under any specific definition of the presented ones, but rather under a general 
assumption of small actor meaning for example small companies, local cooperatives and 
private citizens, without defining more exactly the small actors.  
 
3.2 Suitability of renewable energy auctions for small actors 
As stated in the previous subchapter, actor diversity and the chance for every kind of actors 
to fairly practice their business in the energy markets has been drawing more attention lately. 
It has been noticed, however, that renewable energy auctions attract significantly more large 
actors than small actors, such as local cooperatives, small project developers or private 
citizens. This outcome is no surprise, if a typical renewable energy auction design is taken a 
look at more closely. Many elements can be found, which set the small actors in a weaker 
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position compared to larger actors. (del Río & Linares, 2014; Sawin, 2004) Even EU has 
defined in its State Aid Guidelines that when implementing renewable energy auctions, 
exceptions are allowed with small actors. This indicates, too, that small actors might 
encounter some problems in these auctions. (European Commission, 2014b)  
 
Small actors typically develop smaller and fewer projects than large actors. This fact leads 
to the lower chances to bid successfully in renewable energy auctions. The small projects do 
not have, naturally, the benefits of economies-of-scale, so that the investment and production 
costs per unit would be low. Therefore, small actors have to set higher bids to be able to 
cover the costs of their projects. As auctions are competitive and the aim is to achieve the 
lowest possible costs, the bids with higher costs will be neglected and thus the bids of small 
actors often fall into the neglected class. (Klessmann et al., 2015a) The small size of both 
the actor and the project also causes the actual bidding costs to be higher per unit. The 
bidding costs arise mostly from the bidder familiarising with the auction mechanism. These 
costs increase the bid even more, and auctioning itself might scare some small actors as they 
are generally not that familiar and used to auction systems as the larger companies. 
(Tiedemann et al., 2015) The peculiarity of the auction system to many small actors may 
also cause problems with bidding strategies: if the actor is not familiar with the auction 
mechanism and thus with suitable and successful bidding strategies, it has to create those. 
For successful strategies, expert consultation is often useful or even crucial, thus causing 
again extra costs to the bidder, which in case of a small actor divide to smaller quantity and 
once more the costs per unit and the bid price increase. As small bidders might want to lower 
the bid by not investing that much on the bidding strategy development, larger actors have 
the advantage of, additionally to often lower bids, bidding more strategically and also 
therefore being more likely winners. (Klessmann et al., 2015a) 
 
In addition to higher bids, also the fact that participating to the auctions is harder for small 
than large actors, lowers the auction attractiveness and the chances of successful bidding for 
small actors. In the most cases, bidders will need some external financing for their projects. 
The small actors normally need proportionally more financing than the larger ones, who 
already may have collected profits from multiple previous project. (Klessmann at al., 2015a) 
Furthermore, as small actors do not always have as stable financial state as the larger ones, 
the access to the finances is often harder and the financing conditions worse (del Río & 
Linares, 2014). The harder access to finances does not only affect the project financing of 
small actors but also the ability to pay possible deposits, for example as a guarantee of 
penalty, required to the auctioneer (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014). The penalties as such, as 
well, place another difficulty: in case of non-realisation and the obligation to pay the 
penalties, small actors might be in bankruptcy more likely than the larger bidders, who have 
more liquidity gained from many other projects (Klessmann at al., 2015a). If high 
prequalification criteria are required or by other design elements (e.g. deadlines) it is 
implicitly expressed that the project has to be in a mature phase when entering the auction, 
small actors might not be able or willing to fulfil all the criteria (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014). 
The project development costs prior to the auction are already sunk costs at the time of the 
auction and the small actors are more likely to be neglected than the larger ones, because of 
the often higher bids, so it is likely that small actors have invested proportionally high 
amounts in a project that cannot be realised (BMWi, 2015). One more risk is set if the auction 
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design allows the winning project to be changed after the auction – large bidders can count 
on their large production portfolio and bid therefore lower, but small bidders seldom have 
such portfolios and do not really have the possibility to change the project in case of 
unpredictable negative incidents. All the reasons presented in this paragraph decrease the 
attractiveness of auctions for small actors and lowers their willingness to even start to bid. 
(Klessmann et al., 2015a) 
 
Even though the list of negative features of the auctions from the point of view of a small 
actor is long and the obstacles might seem high, it is not necessarily obvious that small actors 
cannot participate successfully to the renewable energy auctions. Small actors have also 
some advantages compared to larger actors. They normally do not have as high profit 
expectations from the projects as large, international companies, and thus they can use this 
as a lowering factor in the bid prices. Moreover, small actors often also develop projects for 
their own geographical region, where they might be already known and accepted by the local 
citizens. This sets them in a significantly more favourable position as the larger companies 
among the local people, and is also one of the main arguments in the next subchapter, which 
discusses the importance of actor diversity. (del Río, 2015; Klessmann et al., 2015a) 
 
3.3 Discussion of the importance of actor diversity in renewable 
energy auctions 
As small actors might encounter many problems in renewable energy auctions, it is a relevant 
question to discuss if they should be excluded from the auctions or if it is important to design 
the auctions so that also small actors can fairly attend them. In the past years, one of the 
factors enabling such a rapid renewable energy implementation is the participation of 
different types and sizes of actors. Different kind of actors tend to build different kind of 
renewable projects, thus exploiting the whole renewable potential of a country. If only one 
or very few kind of actors would be active market players in the renewable field, it is likely 
that only some of the potential would be used. (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014) 
 
However, as can be concluded from the previous subchapter, the bids of small actors are 
often higher than the bids of larger companies. If some small actors are awarded as winners 
in the auctions even if their bids are not the lowest ones among all the bids, by designing the 
auctions favourable for small actors for example with multiple evaluation criteria, the basic 
principle of the auctions of choosing the most cost-efficient options is violated. By preferring 
smaller actors or for example reserving a certain percentage of the volume auctioned for 
small actors even if the bids were higher than some other bids would cause additional costs 
to the society as the remuneration amount is higher and not the optimal outcome which 
would occur in a pure competitive auction. (Klessmann et al., 2015b) Thus, one of the main 
questions when deciding if small actors should be taken into account is if actor diversity 
should be preferred over the cost-efficiency of the auctions and optimally minimized support 
costs (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014).  
 
One of the most important arguments stating that small actors should not be excluded from 
the renewable energy auctions is the social acceptance of the auctions and renewable energy 
in general. As the auctions tend to favour the least-cost projects, the bidders allowed to 
 21 
 
actually implement their projects have most likely chosen large-scale projects often with 
large installations. Moreover, to achieve the least costs, the project sites are often chosen 
carefully to be in a geographically optimal location, for example for wind turbines in the 
windiest regions or for solar panels in the sunniest areas. The local people close to the good 
renewable regions will experience a huge building boom, and this easily leads to the “not in 
my backyard”-effect. If the local people start to oppose the new renewable projects in their 
regions, the negative attitudes easily spread wider and might over the time lead to negative 
attitudes towards the renewable energy auctions. In case this happens, it is very challenging 
for the policy-makers to try to continue a system that is not accepted among the citizens. 
(Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014; Klessmann et al., 2015a; del Río & Linares, 2014) 
 
Small actors, however, are often exactly those local people, their cooperatives or some 
family businesses, which already are in favour in the region and socially accepted. The 
projects are also often smaller and thus do not for example cause as large landscape 
problems. Furthermore, assuming small actors to be local people, the projects are often built 
in their own regions and not necessarily finding the optimal location nationwide. Thus, the 
projects of small actors are in many cases more equally spread over the country and do not 
cause as high an exploitation of only few areas. (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014) The equally-
spread power production also mitigates power grid congestion problems: when large 
amounts of electricity are produced in only a few geographical locations, it becomes a 
challenge for the power grid to transport the electricity through the few transmission lines 
near to the large power production sites, and grid congestions may occur, not allowing all 
the produced power to be utilized. If the power production is more wide-spread, the 
transmission lines do not experience as high requirements for transmission capacity. (del 
Río, 2015) 
 
There is also a possibility to allow small actors to receive remuneration by some other means 
even though the general principle of support allocation would be the auctions. As small 
actors would not in this case be excluded from the renewable energy markets, the most of 
the above mentioned advantages of having small actors in the markets would hold. The 
different renewable potential possibilities of a country would still be exploited. Local, small 
actors would still have the chance to implement their projects and thus mitigate the local 
acceptance problems. However, as high an amount of large projects of large actors in the 
most profitable sites would be likely to occur as in case of no small actors in the markets at 
all. Thus, including small actors to the auctions would probably cause higher local 
acceptance than allowing them another support method as an exception. (Klessmann et al., 
2015a) Small actors also increase the competition level of the auctions. The more actors are 
allowed or attracted to take part to the auctions, the harder the competition is and the smaller 
is the possibility of collusive behaviour of the bidders. Thus, including small actors in the 
auctions could also help to mitigate one of the main problems of the auctions, a too low 
competition level. (del Río, 2015) 
 
All in all, it seems that small actor participation in some form is important for the renewable 
energy markets. Now without preferring one or the other option, either the renewable energy 
auctions should be designed so that also small actors can take part to them, or small actors 
could be excluded from the auctions but taken into account in some other form of 
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remuneration. A short overview of the other possibilities than auctions for small actors is 
presented in the next subchapter to provide a better understanding on the topic, however not 
going into details, as it does not belong to the scope of this thesis. 
 
3.4 Other possibilities not to exclude small actors from renewable 
energy markets 
In the previous subchapter it has been stated that small actors should not be excluded entirely 
from the renewable energy markets. However, as the auctions might in some cases not be 
suitable for small actors, other means of support can be considered to allow small actors to 
stay on the market. Without any support method small actors could not create economically 
feasible projects and would thus fall off from the markets. (Klessmann et al., 2015b) As the 
main focus of this thesis is on the renewable energy auctions, only a short overview of other 
options is presented.  
 
One option of small actor remuneration is a normal feed-in tariff. The regulatory body would 
decide an amount of support small actors could receive for their renewable projects, and any 
small actor (according to a pre-defined definition) with a renewable project would be eligible 
to receive it. (Klessmann et al., 2015a) This would be a simple method to ensure small actors 
in the markets, when the remuneration level is chosen high enough. However, a regulatory 
set support level would contradict one of the main goals and reasons of auctions, the cost-
efficient remuneration of renewables. An alternative to a regulatory set feed-in tariff would 
be to allow an access for small actors to the same support level as which was defined for the 
winning projects in the auction. (Klessmann et al., 2015b) The price could also be defined 
in this case as an average price of a few of the past auction rounds (Tiedemann et al., 2015). 
This leads, however, to the question if this amount is enough for small actors, as one of the 
main reasons for excluding small actors from the auctions is that they usually have higher 
costs than large bidders and thus would need more remuneration. To define a remuneration 
level that is both cost-efficient and still high enough for the small actors, separate auctions 
for small actors could be organised. A major problem with only few participants and thus 
too little competition would, however, be likely to occur. (Klessmann et al., 2015b) 
 
As can be seen, there are some ways to enable small actor participation in renewable energy 
markets even when the auctions are implemented. The auction design itself has also a large 
significance when considering the small actor friendliness of the auctions. In the next 
chapter, experiences from countries, which have already implemented renewable energy 
auctions, will be presented. The experiences will be discussed especially from the point of 
view of small actors.  
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4 Practical experiences 
4.1 Germany 
The two politically most significant guidelines leading the German energy policy are its 
Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG) and the Energy 
Transition (Energiewende). The EEG was first set on April 1st 2000, and last time renewed 
on August 1st 2014. In EEG it is defined that Germany will have 40 to 45 percent of its 
electricity demand from renewables until 2025 and 55 to 60 percent until 2035. The longer 
timeframe goal is to have at least 80 percent of the electricity demand from renewables in 
2050. (EEG, 2014) In the first half of 2015 the corresponding percentage was 32,5% (BMWi 
website, 03.12.2015). To reach the goals, EEG (2014) sets that at the latest in 2017 the 
remuneration for renewable energy production will be defined in competitive auctions. 
 
Germany is one of the countries where renewable energy implementation has experienced a 
significant and rapid increase in the last years. This is due to a generous feed-in tariff that 
Germany has been offering for renewable energy projects. At the moment Germany is 
among the leading countries in the world in solar and wind energy production percentages 
of the total energy production of the country. The feed-in tariff has been efficient in 
increasing the renewable energy share of energy production. However, the costs for the 
renewable support by feed-in tariff have been high. Furthermore, feed-in tariff has allowed 
renewable energy to be built practically anywhere and in not exactly planned amounts, thus 
missing proper and coordinated planning of implementation. Therefore, it was reasonable to 
re-think the remuneration method in Germany, and along the EEG update in 2014, it was 
decided to move to auction-based support for renewables. Auctions are supposed to decrease 
the costs of renewable energy support and also make it possible to control the quantity of 
new renewable implementations. (BMWi, 2014a) 
 
The renewable technologies contributing to the most of the renewable energy increase in 
Germany are wind and solar energy. Additionally, Germany has also a relatively significant 
amount of hydropower and biomass-based energy production and some geothermal energy, 
but their contribution to the German Energy Transition is not as large: the amount of 
hydropower and geothermal power has stayed relatively same during the last years, and 
whereas biomass has experienced rather high yearly increases some years ago, in the few 
last years the increase has slowed down. Germany considers wind and solar power more 
cost-efficient options for Energy Transition, and thus, the German renewable energy 
legislation and remuneration concentrates more on those two technologies than on 
hydropower, geothermal and biomass. (BMWi, 2014b) Therefore, renewable energy increase 
targets are set technology-specific as following: for solar and onshore wind each 2,5 GW 
new installations yearly, for offshore wind a target of 6,5 GW total installed capacity until 
2020 and 15 GW until 2030, and for biomass 100 MW new installations yearly. For offshore 
wind, the cap is fixed. For the other mentioned technologies, the cap is flexible: if more than 
the targeted amount is built, the support will be lower for the quantities over the cap. (EEG, 
2014) 
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The German energy sector, especially the wind and solar sectors, are at the moment 
characterized by a large actor diversity. Large as well as small actors have been under feed-
in tariff system building up renewable energy plants, and one reason for the high new 
renewable deployment is this actor variety: with many different actors who tend to 
implement different kind of projects, all the renewable potential of a country is utilised. 
(Klessmann et al., 2015a) Germany has realised the importance of the actor diversity in its 
renewable energy field and that small actors have often difficulties to be successful in 
auctions. Therefore, in the same article in the renewed EEG (2014) where the auctions are 
defined to be the renewable support method at the latest from 2017 on, it is also defined that 
the actor diversity is to be kept as high as it is at the moment in Germany. This shows clearly 
that it is important for Germany not to forget small actors or on purpose let them fall off the 
energy production markets.  
 
To experiment the auctions as a remuneration method, Germany organised 15th of April 2015 
the first pilot auction for ground-mounted solar photovoltaic (PV) installations. After the 
first solar PV auction, two subsequent auction rounds for ground-mounted PV plants were 
held in 2015, 1st of August and 1st of December. The six next auction rounds are already 
decided: for both the years 2016 and 2017 three rounds. (FFAV, 2015) The ground-mounted 
solar PV installations were chosen to be the pilot auction technology in Germany, because 
PV installations are relatively fast to implement, and thus the experiences of the auctions are 
possible to collect in a short time frame. From 2017 onwards, the support for all the different 
renewable energy technologies is to be defined by the auctions. (Bundesregierung, 2015) 
 
The most important design aspects of the German PV auctions are described here. The 
auctioneer of the German PV auctions is the Bundesnetzagentur. The auctioned volume in 
the first two rounds was 150 MW and in the third round 200 MW. The planned volumes for 
the coming auction rounds are 125 MW for the two next rounds, 150 MW for the third 
coming round and 100 MW for the last three planned rounds. Altogether the auctioned 
volume over the three years is 1200 MW. If the volume of the previous round is not fulfilled, 
it will be added to the next round’s volume. The auction is organised as a sealed-bid, pay-
as-bid auction, where the only evaluation criterion is the price of the bid, and if the price of 
several bids is the same, the bids with smaller capacities are preferred. The second and third 
auction rounds are exception, they are organised as uniform-price auctions to gather 
experiences. (FFAV, 2015) 
 
Every bidder must submit the bid price, i.e. remuneration level, in terms of produced 
electricity (c/kWh) and the volume of a bid is to be announced in PV plant capacity (kW). 
The volume of a bid must be at least 100 kW and at most 10 MW, and one bidder is allowed 
to submit several bids. The first round of the PV auctions had a ceiling price of 11,49 c/kWh, 
which decreased for the next two rounds held. As prequalification criteria the bidder must 
provide the exact location of the planned installation, and additionally either a decision on 
the building plan, a decision on the publication or an approved building plan on the location 
for the installation. A financial guarantee of 4 euros per kilowatt-hour of the bid volume 
must be deposited by the bidder if a decision on the building plan is included in the bid, and 
if a decision on the publication or an approved building plan is attached to the bid, only 2 
euros per kilowatt-hour is required as a deposit. (FFAV, 2015) 
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After the auction, the successful bidders must submit a second financial guarantee in ten 
working days from the auction results publication. The second guarantee amounts to 50 
euros per kilowatt-hour or 25 euros per kilowatt-hour, respectively, with the conditions that 
applied also to the first deposit. If more than 30 MW of projects fail to deliver the second 
financial guarantee, an extra auction is held for the capacity failed. In this auction all the 
bids, which fulfilled the prequalification criteria in the first round but were not successful, 
are able to participate. The project must be built and commissioned within 18 months, 
otherwise the remuneration decreases by 0,3 c/kWh. The remuneration is also decreased by 
0,3 c/kWh if the project location is changed (which, however, is in principle possible). If the 
project is not realised within 2 years, it is considered as failed and the remuneration for that 
project is cancelled. It is not allowed to change owners of the awarded project before the 
commission of the PV installation. After the commission, the project owner is allowed to 
sell the project to a third party. The financial support is guaranteed for the first 20 years from 
the commission of the plant. If the bidder cancels the project after winning the auction, a 
penalty of the amount of the first financial guarantee is to be paid. If the bidder fails to deliver 
the project within 2 years, a penalty of the amount of the second financial guarantee is to be 
paid. (FFAV, 2015) 
 
As it is important for Germany to preserve the high existing actor diversity, the auctions for 
solar PV are also designed to be suitable for small-sized actors. The design of the auctions 
is intended to be simple, transparent and understandable, so that also small actors have a 
possibility to participate. The flexible guarantee and penalty amount also reinforces small 
actors: if the bidder has a decision on the publication or an approved building plan, the 
guarantee and possible penalty is only the half of the actual amount. This way for example 
local cooperatives, which normally develop only one project, can avoid the high initial 
deposits and risks. Prequalification criteria for the bids is also kept low to attract small actors. 
Additionally, the decrease of the remuneration in case of changed location increases the actor 
diversity, as the large actors have to think carefully before using their advantage of a likely 
larger business area compared to for example local cooperatives. The awarding criteria is 
intentionally defined so that in case of same bid prices, the smaller capacities are preferred, 
thus increasing small actors’ winning possibilities. (Bundesregierung, 2015) 
 
As mentioned, the three first rounds of the German PV auctions are held. At the time of the 
writing of this thesis, there were results of the all three rounds available, and for the first 
round also a bidder feedback-based evaluation. In the first round, 170 bids with a total 
volume of 715 MW were received, of which 25 bids with a total volume of 157 MW were 
successful. The prices of the successful bids were between 8,48 and 9,43 c/kWh. Bids from 
many different kind of actors and of different sizes were received. Table 1 presents the 
number of bids submitted classified in categories of actor types and the bid sizes. However, 
the most of the successful bidders were of one actor type, GmbH & Co. KG, which is a 
German form of business combining features of a limited liability company and a limited 
partnership. Additionally, the most of the bids were in the largest size categories. The actor 
categories of successful bids are represented in table 2 and the size categories of them in 
table 3. (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015a) 
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Table 1 Actor types and project sizes of the submitted bids in the first German solar PV 
auction round (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015a, translated from German into English). 
Actor type 
0,1-0,5 
MW 0,5-1 MW 1-2 MW 2-5 MW 5-10 MW Total 
Natural person 2 2 2 2 0 7 
Civil law partnership 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Limited liability company 3 4 8 20 16 51 
GmbH & Co. KG* 4 6 15 33 35 93 
Limited company 0 0 2 2 4 8 
Registered cooperative 3 0 1 0 0 4 
Other 0 1 2 1 0 4 
Total 12 13 30 60 55 170 
       
* GmbH & Co. KG is a German form of business, which is a combination of limited liability 
company and limited partnership.  
 
Table 2 Actor types of the successful bids in the first German solar PV auction round 
(elaborated from BMWi website, 8.1.2016). 
Actor type Successful bids 
Limited liability company 2 
GmbH & Co. KG 21 
Limited company 2 
Total 25 
 
Table 3 Project sizes of the successful bids in the first German solar PV auction round 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2015a, translated from German into English). 
Size of PV plant 0,1-0,5 MW 0,5-1 MW 1-2 MW 2-5 MW 5-10 MW Total 
Successful bids 0 1 2 7 15 25 
 
The smallest successful project in the first round was a one-megawatt-project. Thus, small 
projects can be successful in the German PV auctions, even though the majority of the 
winners are bigger projects. However, no natural persons, cooperatives or civil law 
partnerships, which are the most typical small actors, were successful in the first round. 
Additionally, when subsidiary companies are taken into account, one company only was the 
winner of 40 % of the successful bids. The results report explains this to have been expected, 
with the market structure with large multi-project bidders. However, the report recognises 
also the actor types that were not successful and claims that the situation will be observed in 
the later rounds and when necessary, those actor types can be classified as small actors with 
special rules in order to preserve actor variety. (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015a) 
 
The bidder feedback-based evaluation of the first round shows that in the opinion of the 
bidders the auction is not optimal for small bidders. Some of the feedback participants 
evaluated the participation of the auctions to cause much additional work load for example 
when familiarising with the auction method and compiling the bid. The majority were of the 
opinion that low experiences in project development or weak finances, which often feature 
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small actors, lead easily to disadvantages in the auction participation. The feedback 
participants have also suggested some special categories or rules for small actors, a cap for 
winning projects of one actor or a simpler auction system to facilitate small actor 
participation. (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015b) 
 
On the second PV auction round, 136 bids with a total volume of 558 MW were submitted 
and 33 of them with a total volume of 159,74 MW were successful. Many of the received 
bids were on the same pieces of land and from the same bidders as in the first round. Because 
of the uniform pricing of this round, the price for every successful bid was the highest 
successful price, 8,49 c/kWh. The lowest bid, however, was 1 c/kWh, which clearly indicates 
strategical bidding. The distribution of the actor types and project sizes of the submitted bids 
is quite similar to the first round: Bids were received from many kind of actors and in many 
project sizes. Moreover, the results of the second round are also very similar to the first 
round. The smallest successful project was again 1 MW and the most of the projects were in 
the two largest size categories, though more projects fell into the second-largest category as 
in the first round. The actor structure in the successful bids was somewhat different to the 
first one: there were no limited companies with a successful bid and one civil law partnership 
bidder was successful. However, the most of the successful bids were again from GmbH & 
Co. KG bidders and a few bids from limited liability companies. (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015c)  
 
The third round received 127 bids with a total volume of 562 MW. From those, 43 bids were 
successful with a total volume of 204,165 MW. This round was also a uniform-price round, 
and the price was 8 c/kWh. Again, strategical bidding was to be seen in a small minority of 
the bids, as the lowest bid was 0,09 c/kWh. The bidder structure and bid project sizes were 
once again very similar to the two first rounds. This round, however, the smallest successful 
bid was only 499 kW and a larger variety of actors were successful: in addition to many 
successful bids of limited liability companies and GmbH & Co. KGs, there were three 
successful bids of civil law partnerships, three of natural persons and two of registered 
cooperatives. This shows a positive trend towards small actor successfulness in the three 
held auction rounds. It is stated, however, as also in the reports of the previous two rounds 
that the competition in these auctions is really high, and the prices of the bids have become 
every round lower. This normally decreases the chances of smaller actors to be successful. 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2016) 
 
It is still too early to draw conclusions of the successfulness of the German pilot PV auctions, 
as only three rounds are held and the successful bidders also from the first round have still 
some months time to commission their projects. However, as stated many times before, it is 
important for Germany to include also small actors in the renewable energy markets. The 
three rounds held show that it might be possible for small actors to be successful also in the 
auctions without any special rules, but the results and analyses of a longer time and especially 
from other renewable technologies are to be seen only after some years. To conclude the 
most relevant observations from the German renewable auctions from the point of view of 
small actors, a summary is presented in table 4.  
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Table 4 Summary of the German auction experiences from the point of view of small actors. 
Technologies solar PV 
Small actors small actors taken into account in design, actor diversity important 
Experiences 
small and large actors participating, mostly large actors winning, 
some small actors successful 
Main problems in small 
actor participation not (yet) enough successful small actors 
Recommendations for 
small actors 
simple auction design, smaller capacities preferred in case of same 
price, flexible prequalification criteria and penalty system, avoiding 
large actors using their wide portfolios (location and owner changes 
penalised or prohibited) 
 
4.2 Denmark 
Denmark is one of the world’s leading countries in renewable energy implementation 
(Kitzing & Wendring, 2015). The oil crisis in 1973 led Denmark to set ambitious goals for 
its own energy production, with both fossil fuels and all the time more with renewable energy 
sources. Since the end of 1970s, Denmark has been implementing wind turbines to produce 
electricity. Denmark was also the first country in the world to build offshore wind turbines 
in 1991. The real wind boom in Denmark started in the late 1990s. (Danish Energy Agency, 
2009) As the situation of the year 2014, 38,8 % of the Danish electricity production was 
covered by wind energy, 11,4 % with biomass and 3,2 % with solar energy, hydro power 
and biogas, amounting altogether to 53,4 % renewable share in electricity production. The 
share of renewable energy in the total energy consumption was 28,5 %. (Danish Energy 
Agency, 2015a) Denmark has defined its renewable energy goals as following: in 2020 35 
% renewables of total energy consumption and 50 % wind energy of electricity consumption, 
in 2035 100 % renewables of electricity and heat supply and in 2050 100 % renewables of 
total energy consumption (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015). 
 
In 2008, Denmark made a Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, which came into effect in 
the beginning of 2009. The Act sets the rules for putting up a wind turbine either onshore or 
offshore, or other kind of a renewable energy power plant. It also sets the support level as a 
feed-in tariff for onshore wind turbines and other renewable energy. According to the Act, 
the energy producers can receive support for offshore wind in two ways: either the same 
support that is offered for onshore wind, or after winning a public tendering procedure. The 
support is paid as a feed-in tariff. The dominance of wind power in the Danish energy market 
is clearly visible in the Act, as the most of the sections in it concern onshore or offshore wind 
turbines. (Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, 2008) Also before the Promotion of 
Renewable Energy Act, support was provided to renewable energy. In case of wind energy, 
it depended on the size and grid connecting date of the wind turbines. With the Act from 
2008, the Danish government wanted to improve the attractiveness of putting up wind 
turbines to achieve the renewable goals, and therefore increased the previous remuneration 
level. (Danish Energy Agency, 2009) At the moment, Danish parliament is strongly 
supportive towards renewable energy and especially wind energy, thus the wind-friendly 
policy security for the near future is relatively high (Danish Energy Agency, 2013a). 
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The remuneration for offshore wind parks have been auctioned in Denmark already before 
the Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, since 2005, by the Danish Energy Agency. Until 
the end of 2015, Denmark had had five offshore wind auction rounds and two more rounds 
were planned for 2016. The auctions have been held in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2015. 
There is no regular frequency when the auctions are organised. Only one offshore wind farm 
is auctioned at a time. The location for the wind farm is already pre-defined and only one 
bidder can win the auction and has to realise the whole project. Prior to the auction, the 
Danish Energy Agency conducts an Environmental Impact Assessment and a preliminary 
seabed analysis for the site to be auctioned. In these single-item auctions also the volume of 
the project is defined, and it varies between the different projects. The bidders compete in 
price of the bid, i.e. the feed-in tariff they would need to realise and run the project. The 
bidder with the lowest price wins the bid and is awarded with the bid price, so the auction is 
a pay-as-bid auction. The support is paid for the first 50 000 full load hours, which accounts 
approximately for 12-15 years. (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015) 
 
Every auction round, however, has had many special features that differ from the other 
rounds. The first auction round was held in February 2005 and the site Horns Rev 2 was 
auctioned. The size of the project was 200 MW. The auction consisted of two rounds: during 
the first round the bidders submitted their first bids, all the bidders filling the prequalification 
criteria were invited to a meeting with the Danish Energy Agency, and after the meetings 
the bidders submitted the final bid. As prequalification criteria the bidder had to provide 
documentation of the company’s financial situation and of the previous wind energy (also 
offshore) projects. Five best bidders were invited to the meetings, whose purpose was to 
negotiate with the bidders individually about the final bidding round conditions and this way 
achieve lower bid prices. In this round also some other aspects than price, for example 
project time plan, were considered, when awarding the winner. The auction was won by 
DONG Vind A/S, a large Danish energy company, with the price of 51,8 øre/kWh (6,9 
c/kWh). No penalties for project delay or cancellation were introduced. The second offshore 
auction round of the site Rødsand 2 was in May 2006 and the auction features were really 
similar to the Horns Rev 2 auction. Also this time 200 MW was auctioned and the auction 
procedure was the same. The winner was this time a consortium of three big energy 
companies, of which one was the winner of the last round, with the price of 49,9 øre/kWh 
(6,7 c/kWh). (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015) 
 
The Rødsand 2 project was, however, not realised. Therefore, a new auction round for the 
same project was held in April 2008. The auction procedure was this time changed: There 
was no negotiations between the bidders and the Danish Energy Agency, but only one final 
bidding round where the bidders had to submit their first and at the same time final offer. 
Also no prequalification criteria were required, except a standard criterion of Danish public 
tenders of the bidder not having over 100 000 Danish krone debt to public entities. The 
awarding criterion was the price only. The auction winner was a large energy company E.ON 
Vind Sverige AB with the price of 62,9 ø/kWh (8,5 c/kWh). This time the project was 
realised. The next auction was held in April 2010 for a 390-400 MW project Anholt. This 
round had also only one bidding round without negotiations and without prequalification 
criteria. However, first time in Danish offshore auctions penalties were introduced. There 
would be a reduction on the support price if the network connection of the first turbine was 
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delayed, and a penalty payment if the network connection of the last turbine was delayed. 
Both of the penalties were gradually increasing with longer delays. The auction received 
only one bid. That bidder, DONG Energy A/S, was awarded the project with a price of 105,1 
øre/kWh (14,1 c/kWh). As the price was significantly higher than the previous auction 
prices, an investigation by a third party was conducted and the price was considered 
reasonable. (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015) 
 
The last auction round finished until the end of 2015 was held in February 2015 for Horns 
Rev 3. The auctioned quantity was 390-410 MW. The two-round auction design with bidder 
negotiations between the rounds was again introduced for this auction. Additionally, an 
extensive list of prequalification criteria was to be fulfilled by the bidders. The criteria 
included for example references to former wind energy projects, minimum annual turnover 
of 15 billion Danish krone, likely-to-be-used turbine and foundation type and negotiation 
suggestions for the meeting with the auctioneer. The penalties for delays were this time also 
applied but changed from the previous round. A gradually increasing penalty payment is 
applied if the constructing starts too late, and if the network connection of 95 % of the 
turbines is delayed, the support period is decreased. The auction was won by Vattenfall Wind 
Power A/S, once again a large company. The awarded price was 77 øre/kWh (10,3 c/kWh). 
(Kitzing & Wendring, 2015) 
 
There are two more auction rounds planned for offshore wind projects. The next round to be 
held in April 2016 is for nearshore wind projects and after that a round in November 2016 
for Kriegers Flak project of 600 MW capacity. The design of the Kriegers Flak auction 
procedure is again the two-round auction with negotiations in between. (Kitzing & Wendring 
2015) The prequalification criteria includes for example likely-to-be-used turbine and 
foundation type and a letter of intent from the financer (Danish Energy Agency, 2015b). The 
penalties are planned to be the same as in the Horns Rev 3 auction round. In the end of 2015, 
there were 8 companies applying for prequalification for the auction round. (Kitzing & 
Wendring, 2015) 
 
The nearshore auction round differs a lot from all the previous rounds. In this auction round, 
350 MW will be auctioned to several offshore wind farm projects in nearshore areas. There 
are six predefined areas where it is possible to implement the projects in this round. Several 
bidders can win in this auction with different projects. (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015) On one 
predefined site, it is possible to have a projects of maximum 200 MW, and also multiple 
projects on one site are possible (Danish Energy Agency, 2013a). This auction round also 
first time introduces a ceiling price, 70 øre/kWh. Despite the multi-item auction, the price 
for the successful bidder(s) will be defined by pay-as-bid rule. As prequalification criteria, 
references from previous offshore wind projects, minimum annual turnover of 4 billion 
Danish krone and debt rating requirements are required from the bidder enterprise. In case 
of project cancellation of a successful winner, a penalty payment is to be paid. If the grid 
connection is delayed, the support period is decreased. In the end of 2015, there were three 
bidders for the nearshore auction round. (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015) 
 
Additionally, Denmark has an ongoing tendering procedure for 50 MW of test projects of 
offshore wind technology. The aim of this auction is to allow new technologies, which are 
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ready to be commercialised, to be tested, and by the testing to contribute to lowering costs 
for the offshore wind electricity production. The sites are not pre-defined as in other Danish 
offshore auctions, but the bidder has to decide the best site for the particular test and apply 
for it. Neither are preliminary investigations done by the Danish Energy Agency, but have 
to be conducted by the bidder. It is, however, possible to build the test turbines in existing 
test sites or together with a normal offshore wind project. The new technologies or 
components to be tested can be for example turbine or foundation parts, new ways to operate 
a turbine or new transmission at the offshore wind farm. The testing cannot be only for pure 
research purposes but must after the test phase receive new experiences and be able to 
commercialise the tested technology. As prequalification criteria the bidder has to conduct 
screening of the planned testing side and provide evidence that the bidder is capable of 
performing the whole project from receiving the licences and building up the project to 
operating and decommissioning it. In this auction, the price is not an evaluation criterion but 
it is fixed at 70 øre/kWh for about the first 50 000 full load hours, and it can be awarded to 
a maximum of eight turbines per project. Instead, development potential and commercial 
perspective are evaluated when awarding the winners. (Danish Energy Agency, 2015c) 
 
In all the auction rounds, the auction winners have been large companies. Additionally, the 
other bidders taking part in the auctions were large companies, as well. This was also 
expected: the nature of the offshore wind projects requires often large companies. Also the 
prequalification criteria requiring strong experiences in offshore wind projects practically 
closed out smaller or new actors. (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015) In the nearshore auction round, 
the requirements for the auction were intentionally lowered in order to attract new bidders. 
Indeed, two of the three bidders in this auction round are new to Danish offshore market. 
However, these two new actors are also large companies. (Agora Energiewende & DTU 
Management Engineering, 2015) The auction design in all the auction rounds has allowed 
consortiums to take part to the auctions. If a consortium applies as a bidder, the fulfilment 
of the prequalification criteria is calculated from all the in the consortium participating actors 
altogether, not separately. (Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, 2008) This way, in theory, 
also smaller actors might have a possibility to take part in the auction as a part of a larger 
consortium. This has, however, not yet happened. (Kitzing & Wendring, 2015) 
 
Although the real possibilities for smaller actors to participate in Danish offshore auctions 
are rather small, Denmark pays a lot of attention on the local acceptability of the renewable 
energy and this way also the possibilities of local people to benefit from the wind projects 
(Danish Energy Agency, 2009). In the Promotion of Renewable Energy Act from 2008, there 
were four legal schemes introduced to preserve and improve the local acceptability. The 
schemes are namely the loss-of-value scheme, the option-to-purchase scheme, the green 
scheme and the guarantee scheme. In this version of the Act, the offshore and nearshore 
projects implemented by the tendering procedures were, however, excluded from these 
obligations. (Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, 2008). The parts of the Act concerning 
the option-to-purchase and loss-of-value schemes were renewed in 2013 and the nearshore 
auctions were included in the schemes (Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, 2013). 
 
Both of those schemes aim to increase local acceptability of the near-shore turbines: The 
loss-of-value scheme allows the residents within the distance of up to six times of the height 
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of the wind turbine to receive compensation for the value loss of the property from the wind 
turbine owner, and the option-to-purchase scheme obliges the wind farm owner to offer at 
least 20 % share of the wind project ownership to be purchased by local residents. Thus, 
option-to-purchase scheme can also be seen as a way to include smaller actors in offshore 
tendering. In this scheme, the local residents have a possibility to buy shares of the winner 
projects (one person can buy maximum 50 % of the offered shares) and thus also benefit 
financially when the project makes profit. The local residents are in this scheme defined as 
the people who have their official residence maximum 4,5 km from the nearest wind turbine 
of the wind farm. As this rule is a general rule for also onshore wind turbines, it is extended 
to better fit the nearshore wind farm situation: Any person, who has their official residence 
in a coastal land in a municipality within 16 km of the wind farm, is allowed to purchase 
shares of the project. If there are more interest from the above defined people to buy the 
shares than there are shares, the shares will be divided so that everyone receives first one 
share, then the persons who were interested to receive at least two shares receive the second 
share, and so on, until the offered share amount is covered. This way a widest possible 
ownership distribution is achieved. (Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, 2013) The 
obligation is only to offer the 20 % share to the local residents, not to achieve the 20 % local 
resident ownership. However, an additional scheme is introduced to incentivise the owners 
to reach high local ownership percentages. If a local ownership percentage of minimum 30 
% is reached, the owner receives additional support payment. The payment is in a form of a 
supplement to the sold energy price, 1 øre/kWh produced. (Danish Energy Agency, 2013b) 
 
As it is clear, Denmark does not design the offshore wind tenders to suit small actors. The 
offshore wind energy sector, however, is as stated before in the most cases in its nature more 
suitable for larger companies. As Denmark does not have auctions for any other renewable 
energy form, it is rather logical not to attract on purpose smaller actors directly to the 
tendering. However, the small actors are taken into account in tendering indirectly in some 
cases: the local people are allowed to purchase shares from the nearshore auction winner 
projects. This way the local people, who are one part of typical small actors, are also involved 
in some renewable projects resulting from tendering. To conclude the most relevant 
observations from the Danish renewable auctions from the point of view of small actors, a 
summary is presented in table 5.  
 
Table 5 Summary of the Danish auction experiences from the point of view of small actors. 
Technologies offshore wind 
Small actors 
no small actors in the auctions, local citizens can buy shares of 
nearshore wind projects 
Experiences 
projects mainly realised without delays, local citizen ownership 
scheme to promote local acceptability of wind projects 
Main problems in small 
actor participation the nature of the auctioned technology 
Recommendations for 
small actors 
if no small actors available because of the technology features, 
promoting local accessibility by other means possible 
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4.3 France 
France is one of the biggest electricity producers in Europe. The first remarkable renewable 
energy action in policy-making level was a so-called EOLE 2005 in 1996. The goal of the 
EOLE 2005 was to improve the French wind energy sector and electricity production from 
wind in France with targets reaching up to the year 2005. The policy was in force until the 
year 2000, when a new energy law replaced it. The new law had higher goals for the 
renewable energy production, also with higher remuneration levels. (Ruokonen et al., 2010) 
In the year 2009 the European Directive 2009/28/EC obliged every EU member country to 
make a National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) with renewable energy targets 
for 2020 and the measures to reach the targets (European Council, 2009). The renewable 
target for France was set to be 23 % of the total energy consumption and 27 % of the 
electricity demand (NREAP France, 2010). These targets are technology-specific divided as 
following: 19 GW onshore wind, 6 GW offshore wind, 5,4 GW solar power and 2,3 GW 
biomass total capacity until 2020 (IEA Wind, 2015). These targets were updated in 2015 in 
Energy Transition Act to reach to the year 2030. The renewable share of the total energy 
consumption should be 32 % and of the electricity demand 40 % in 2030. (Energy Transition 
Act, 2015) In 2014, the renewable share of the country’s electricity demand was 19,5 %. The 
largest renewable technology in France is hydropower, and also wind, solar and biomass-
based technologies contribute to the renewable electricity production share. (IEA Wind, 
2015)  
 
Renewable energy auctions have taken place in France since EOLE 2005, as the first 
tendering round was organized in 1996. As EOLE 2005 was introduced for wind power 
promotion, also the first auction round was organized for wind power projects. Altogether 
50 MW of onshore wind power were tendered by the Ministry of Industry and Environment 
and Energy Management Agency in two categories: 15 MW for projects with already 
finished wind measurements on the site and 35 MW for projects with installed wind 
measurement devices on the site. As the goal of the EOLE was not only to achieve cost 
efficiency of the wind energy but to also improve the whole wind energy sector in France, 
price was not the only awarding criterion in the auction. In addition to the price of the bid, 
also economic advantages of the project, long term benefits of the technology, technical and 
financial reliability, environmental issues and local authorities’ opinion of the bids were 
evaluated. Also technological and regional diversity were considered when awarding the 
auction winners. The winning projects were compared to nowadays’ wind project sizes 
rather small, between 0,6 and 7,2 MW. The average price of the awarded projects was 5,2 
ECU cents/kWh (ECU was the calculatory European monetary unit before euro and its value 
equalled to euro). (Laali & Benard, 1999) 
 
Until the year 2000 and the termination of the EOLE 2005 program, altogether 55 projects 
with a total volume of 361 MW were contracted as a result of several tendering rounds for 
wind energy (Ruokonen et al., 2010). However, only about 20 % of the contracted projects 
were in the end realised, resulting in only 70 MW increase in wind energy in the EOLE 2005 
program (del Río & Linares, 2014). The new renewable energy policy in 2000 changed the 
main renewable remuneration system from tendering to feed-in tariffs. In this system for 
example wind energy receives 8,2 c/kWh for the first 10 years and depending on the wind 
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conditions 2,8 to 8,2 c/kWh for the following 5 years. To be able to increase the renewable 
energy share into the target levels, France launched a so-called multiannual programming of 
investment (Programmation Pluriannuelle des Investissements, PPI), which sets the targets 
for renewable energy by technology. The PPI scheme allows the government to release calls 
for tenders to complete the new renewable energy building targets if the feed-in tariff scheme 
does not lead to desired renewable levels in a specific technology. Within the PPI scheme, 
tendering procedures are organised when needed to assure achieving the objectives. The 
auctions are organized by the Energy Regulation Commission (Commission de régulation 
de l’énergie, CRE) in cooperation with the Ministry of Energy. (Ruokonen et al., 2010) 
 
The auction design in the PPI scheme varies between the different renewable technologies 
and rounds, but some basic principles are in common with the various rounds. There are two 
main types of tendering procedures in the PPI scheme: a normal procedure with extensive 
bids and multi-criteria evaluation and a fast online procedure with more compact bids and 
only quantitative evaluation criteria. (CEER, 2016) The call for tenders defines the desired 
increase of the specific technology in different regions and also to some extent in plant sizes 
and amounts in a region. As prequalification criteria the bidders have to provide the supply 
contract for the fuel (in biomass tenders), pre-study on the grid connection, other possible 
studies conducted and an ownership or rental contract for the planned site. The auction is a 
pay-as-bid auction and the price will be paid typically for 20 years. There are several 
awarding criteria to select the winners; price is always evaluated and the other criteria depend 
on the auction round and the auctioned technology, though they are often similar to the 
EOLE selection criteria. If the project is delayed or failed, there are penalties in form of 
decrease in the support period or a penalty payment. (Ruokonen et al., 2010) After the bids 
are submitted, in case the auctioneer considers the competition level too low to achieve cost 
efficiency, it may cancel the auction (CEER, 2016). 
 
The first PPI tendering round was organised in 2003 for covering peak electricity demand 
on one French island (Ruokonen et al., 2010). After that, until the end of the year 2015, there 
had been many additional rounds for different technologies: onshore and offshore wind, 
biomass and solar power. In 2004, one round for biomass and one round for offshore wind 
were organised. The next round was for onshore wind in 2005. A round for biomass was 
again organised in 2007. The years 2009 and 2010 experienced both two rounds, one for 
biomass in both years and in 2009 one for PV over 250 kW and in 2010 one for onshore 
wind with batteries. Until 2011 the auction rounds had been irregular, and as the PPI 
suggested, used to balance the differences between the renewable targets and by feed-in tariff 
implemented capacities. In 2011, however, more regular tendering rounds started for PV and 
offshore wind technologies. Thus, there was one offshore round in 2011 and 2013 each, and 
several, foreseeable rounds for PV installations since 2012. The change to more regular 
rounds were made in case of PV technology because of a failed auction round in 2009. As 
the power producers could also receive remuneration with a normal feed-in tariff, the tariff 
level appeared to set the minimum price for the bidders as no one wanted to bid for a worse 
price as what they could receive without a hard bidding procedure. This resulted in too high 
bidding prices and the auction round was cancelled. Since then, auctions are the main 
remuneration method for medium (100-250 kW) and large (over 250 kW) scale PV 
installations and thus organised on a more regular basis. (CEER, 2016) The following 
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paragraphs describe as examples closer some of the auction procedures organised since 
2000. 
 
The tendering round for biomass organised in 2007 auctioned 200 MW to projects larger 
than 9 MW and 80 MW to projects between 5 and 9 MW. In addition to the above mentioned 
prequalification criteria, the bidders had to provide also specifics about the technology and 
equipment to be implemented and energy production estimates. The bids were evaluated 
based on the price, biomass supply plan, energy efficiency and technical and financial 
capabilities of the bidder. The support was contracted from the commissioning date until the 
1st of January 2030. This round received a total of 56 bids with a total volume of 692 MW. 
Only one bidder did not fulfil the prequalification criteria. Altogether 22 bidders were 
awarded as winners, 84,6 MW for the smaller projects and 229,8 MW for the larger projects. 
The average price of the winning projects was 128,1 €/MWh. (Ruokonen et al., 2010) Since 
then, the PPI scheme has experienced also significantly lower prices: for example, the 
average winning price of the tendering round in 2009 was only 45 €/MWh (del Rìo & 
Linares, 2014). 
 
The first round of offshore wind tenders in 2004 failed in project realisation, as in the end 
no project awarded in the auction was realised. This was stated to result from many local 
issues. The offshore wind target being as high as 6 GW by 2020, the government realised 
that more and better designed auctions have to be organised. Therefore, before the next round 
organised in 2011, the government decided with local authorities six offshore wind zones 
for the coming auctions. Two of the sites were awarded in 2011 round and the rest, 4 sites, 
in 2013. The evaluation was conducted in both rounds again by multiple criteria, for example 
price, industrial development, environmental aspects and research and development 
contribution of the project. The rounds did not receive a lot of bids and there were only two 
bidders for an auctioned zone on average, thus leading to a low competition level. One zone 
had to be cancelled from the auction as it received only one bid. The low competition led to 
relatively high average winning prices: in 2011 the average price was 220 €/MWh and in 
2013 a bit lower, 200 €/MWh. In addition to low competition level, also high risks for the 
bidders in form of technical uncertainties during the auction time (when the project specifics 
have to be defined without knowing the exact conditions on the site) and a focus also on 
research and development might have increased the bid prices. (CEER, 2016) 
 
As stated, the PV auctions have been organised more frequently and foreseeably since 2012. 
In 2011, CRE published a call for tenders for medium-scale rooftop PV installations. This 
call included seven rounds: five rounds spread over the year 2012 and two for the beginning 
of 2013. In 2013, one more round for the end of 2013 and two rounds for 2014 were 
announced. Additionally, in the beginning of 2015 one round for 2015 and two rounds for 
2016 were published. Also large-scale PV auctions have had more frequent rounds since 
2011, though not as frequent as the medium-scale PV auctions. Rounds have been organised 
in 2011, 2013 and 2014, and additionally a round for medium- and large-scale PV 
installations in non-interconnected regions was organised in 2015. (CRE website, 2016) 
Tenders for the medium-scale PV plants were organised as fast online procedures, thus 
simple for the bidders (CEER, 2016). As prequalification criteria, the bidder had to be the 
owner of the building where the installation was planned to be built and a carbon dioxide 
 36 
 
(CO2) assessment and a statement of recycling of the installation after its lifetime had to be 
submitted along with the bid. The CO2 assessment was also a part of the evaluation criteria, 
contributing to 33 % of the evaluation, whereas the price of the bid contributed to the rest. 
The support (i.e. the bid price for the successful bidders) is paid for 20 years, and 80 % of it 
is fix and 20 % indexed. The projects had to be realised in 18 months. In case of delays, the 
support period could be shortened. All the rounds in 2012 received a lot of bids compared to 
the auctioned capacity. However, many bids did not pass the prequalification criteria in the 
first year’s rounds, which resulted in low competition level and higher prices than expected. 
The prequalification criteria were recognised to be challenging and also the instructions for 
that insufficient. Therefore, the auction rules were re-designed for the next rounds and thus 
the two first rounds in 2013 cancelled. (Held et al., 2014) The re-design functioned, and the 
prices decreased from the highest average price of 2012 rounds, 232 €/MWh, to the lowest 
average price of 2013 rounds, 153 €/MWh. The large-scale auctions were also successful 
and resulted in varying PV technologies: rooftop installations, ground-mounted plants as 
well as systems utilising concentrated solar technology were all successful. (CEER, 2016) 
 
The suitability and friendliness of the French tendering rounds for small actors have varied 
a lot, depending on the type and design of the auction round. The EOLE 2005 scheme did 
not encourage small actors to participate in the auctions. Quite on the contrary, the EOLE 
auction rounds attracted large international wind companies, which started their dominance 
in the French wind markets. (Ruokonen et al., 2010) One of the most significant benefits of 
taking small actors into account, public acceptance, was, however, also in EOLE scheme 
contributed by requiring a certain regional distribution in the successful bids (del Río & 
Linares, 2014; Ruokonen et al., 2010). The PPI scheme, as well, was stated to be unsuitable 
for small actors because of the high expenses of putting up the tender (Ruokonen et al., 
2010). Another concrete issue emerged in the newer, 2011 and 2013 offshore wind tender 
rounds. The time between the announcement of the auction round and the deadline for 
submitting bids was in 2011 six months and in 2013 nine months. As offshore wind farms 
need extensive measurements before actually installing the farm, those time frames were too 
short for the whole measurement and bid processing operations. Thus, the bidders had to 
already have conducted some preliminary measurements on the sites to be able to submit 
possibly successful bids. This prevented new market players from participating in those 
auction rounds. Often the small actors are also new actors, thus, this was an additional 
obstacle for small actors in these offshore tendering rounds. (CEER, 2016) 
 
Even though the most of the French renewable auction rounds have not been suitable for 
small actors, there are also some positive experiences. In fact, the medium-scale rooftop PV 
auctions were especially intended for smaller actors. The simple online system with no 
financial guarantees was designed for private building owners. The call for tenders managed 
to reach high interest in the target group and received a lot of bids. However, as stated before, 
a high amount of bids in the first five rounds had to be neglected because of not fulfilling 
the prequalification criteria. The prequalification criteria included CO2 assessment, which is 
a hard task for a private, not energy technology oriented person without experience in such 
actions. Therefore, the prequalification criteria and the whole design of the auctions was 
renewed and simplified to better suit the needs of small actors. (Fraunhofer ISI et al., 2014; 
Held et al., 2014) 
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All in all, France has a wide experience in organising renewable energy auctions. Some of 
the organised rounds have been successful in several means, some have failed in some 
aspects. From the point of view of small actors, only the later PV auction rounds have been 
attractive and possible to participate. Until now, there have not been any signs in other 
technologies’ auctions to especially design them to ease the participation of small actors. 
However, if the medium-scale PV auction trend continues as it has been for the last three 
years, this sector offers possibilities for small actors to be active in the renewable energy 
auctions in France. To conclude the most relevant observations from the French renewable 
auctions from the point of view of small actors, a summary is presented in table 6.  
 
Table 6 Summary of the French auction experiences from the point of view of small actors. 
Technologies wind onshore & offshore, biomass, solar PV 
Small actors only in the latest solar PV auctions 
Experiences 
the former schemes did not attract small actors, the latest solar PV 
auctions attract many but had to be simplified in order to allow them 
to be successful 
Main problems in small 
actor participation 
in PPI scheme: high costs for preparing the bid, in the latest solar PV 
auctions: too complicated prequalification criteria in the first rounds 
Recommendations for 
small actors 
as simple design as possible, online, no financial guarantees, no 
complicated prequalification criteria 
 
4.4 The Netherlands 
The Dutch energy system is characterised by gas- and coal-fired power plants. In 2011, only 
4,3 % of the total energy consumption in the Netherlands was produced with renewable 
energy sources and in 2013, 9 % of the installed power capacity was renewable energy 
capacity. The renewable target for 2020 is therefore for the Netherlands rather ambitious – 
the renewable share of total energy consumption should be until then 14 %. (Bayer & Baker, 
2014) In 2003, the Netherlands started with a feed-in premium-based remuneration to the 
renewable energy technologies. The premium level was predetermined, dependant on the 
technology and paid for the ten first operation years on top of the market electricity price. 
The premium level was set every year to suit the development on the technology prices. The 
implementation of new renewables increased significantly, and in 2005 there was not enough 
budget for more support, so the premium level was set to zero for biomass and offshore 
wind. The government believed in reaching the renewable targets with already contracted 
capacity. However, in 2008, new and more ambitious renewable targets, 14 % by 2020, were 
set, and the Dutch government had to re-think the remuneration methods. Therefore, in the 
same year, the Sustainable Energy Incentive Scheme (Stimulering Duurzame 
Energieproductie, SDE) was implemented to be able to reach the new objectives. It was also 
a feed-in premium system, where the premium level was calculated on a yearly basis for PV, 
biomass, hydropower and onshore wind. In the premium level calculation, the possible 
average incomes of a renewable technology producer were subtracted from the average 
production costs of a specific renewable technology. The support was allocated to the 
projects every year until the yearly budget of a technology was exhausted. In the SDE 
scheme, offshore wind support was auctioned. (Ruokonen et al., 2010) 
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In 2011, the SDE scheme was updated to an SDE+ scheme. SDE+ is an auction-based 
support scheme, where auction winners receive a floating premium for the energy 
production. The goal of the SDE+ scheme is to achieve the 2020 targets with the least costs. 
(Held et al., 2014) The SDE+ differs from the SDE in an objective-setting sense so that it 
focuses on the short-term renewable implementation on only 2020 targets, whereas the SDE 
was focusing on longer-term implementation and also innovations. There is an overall annual 
budget for the scheme, and when the budget is exhausted, no more support is allocated to 
renewable energy under this scheme in that year. The budget is covered by the electricity 
consumers, which is a new model in the Dutch renewable remuneration – in the earlier 
schemes the support was financed by taxpayers and the government budget. (Winkel et al., 
2011) The budget was for 2011 1,5 billion euros, for 2012 1,7 billion euros, for 2013 3 billion 
euros and for 2014 and 2015 3,5 billion euros (Held et al., 2014; NL Enterprise Agency, 
2015a & b). The SDE+ scheme does not only offer support for renewable electricity, but 
also for biogas fed into the Dutch natural gas network and renewable heat or combined heat 
and power (CHP) production (NL Agency, 2012). 
 
In addition to the SDE+ scheme, the Netherlands has at the moment also other support 
schemes for minor renewable projects. Many different tax incentive schemes are in force in 
order to support projects, which cannot receive support from SDE+ scheme. One of the tax 
incentive schemes is the Tax Deduction Scheme. In this scheme the renewable energy 
projects are allowed to deduct a maximum of 41,5 % of their total investment costs from the 
profits of the installation year in taxation. There are caps per technology for this subsidy, but 
on average 10 % of the investment costs can be covered through this scheme. The Tax 
Deduction can also be applied when receiving SDE+ subsidy. (Winkel et al., 2011) An 
additional tax incentive scheme is the Environmental Investment Rebate, which offers a tax 
refund for all the entrepreneurs who invest in a technology contributing to environmental 
friendliness. Another scheme, Arbitrary Depreciation of Environmental Investments, allows 
the entrepreneur to depreciate the investment in accounting when the entrepreneur wants to. 
The investments eligible for the two schemes are listed in an Environmental List, which is 
updated annually by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. (NL Enterprise 
Agency, 2014) As the SDE+ scheme does not contribute to innovation in renewable 
technologies, there are for example financially supported initiatives and innovation projects 
to develop technologies further and this way achieve cost reductions in renewable 
technologies by innovation. These schemes are applied for example to offshore wind energy, 
as it is at the moment still one of the most expensive renewable technologies. (Verhees et 
al., 2015; Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, 2011) 
 
The renewable energy auctions have been held in the Netherlands since 2010. The first 
auction round was organised under the SDE scheme and 950 MW of offshore wind power 
was tendered. The bidders had to already in 2009 apply for required water permits. Along 
with the bid, the bidders had to submit also the water permit, the planned plant distance to 
the shore, project timetable and financial calculations of the project. The bid prices in costs 
per energy produced were evaluated and the lowest cost projects were awarded with their 
bid price, which was a floating premium on the top of the electricity market price. In sense 
of the support sum the project owners receive, a floating premium is equivalent to a feed-in 
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tariff. (Ruokonen et al., 2010) The premium was contracted for 15 years of operation. The 
projects were supposed to be awarded until the pre-defined budget, 4,5 billion euros, was 
exhausted, and the 950 MW was a capacity cap. (Verhees et al., 2015) The awarded projects 
had to be realised in 5 years, and in case of a project cancellation or delay a penalty of 20 
million euros was to be paid. The water permits of the projects not winning the auctions were 
cancelled. (Ruokonen et al., 2010) There were altogether twelve eligible bidders for this 
auction round, mostly large foreign companies. The auction was won by two German 
projects, both of a subsidiary of one large German company. The projects were both 300 
MW of size and it was noticed that the budget would not cover all the planned 950 MW of 
new capacity. (Verhees et al., 2015) 
 
As the SDE+ scheme changed the main renewable subsidy method to auctions, tendering 
rounds have been organised regularly since the change. As the objective of the SDE+ 
program is to achieve the renewable increases as cost-efficiently as possible and there is a 
general, not technology-specific budget cap annually, the different renewable technologies 
are competing against each other in price and only the cheapest ones are realised. (Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, 2011) The auction is basically a volume 
auction with a dynamic, ascending clock auction mechanism. The government announces 
annually an auction with several rounds. Each round has a so-called base amount, that is the 
price of the round. The base amount increases every round. There are as many rounds 
organised as there is still budget left. The bidders bidding already in the early rounds thus 
receive a lower subsidy, but the bidders waiting for the later rounds with higher support 
levels have the risk of budget exhausting before those rounds and not having a chance to bid 
at all. (Held et al., 2014) The auction system is technology neutral in that sense that all the 
technologies take part in the same auctions and compete for the same budget. However, in 
every round, the base amount is calculated for each technology separately. That means that 
every technology has a different base amount in one round, thus the auction design avoids 
windfall profits. There is always also a free category for the technologies which do not have 
their own category, typically more expensive technologies like offshore wind energy and 
small-scale PV. The free category offers a chance also for innovative, cost-reductive projects 
without specifying the technology. (Winkel et al., 2011) The base amount for each 
technology is calculated annually based on the expected renewable energy costs and energy 
price. The budget needed as remuneration for a project is calculated with the base amount, 
subsidy period, nominal capacity and maximum or estimated full load hours. As this reflects 
the production volume of the project, this feature makes the auction a volume auction. (NL 
Agency, 2012) 
 
For every year of SDE+ scheme auctions, a table with all the rounds, technology categories 
and respective base prices are published. For example in 2012, onshore wind, hydro power, 
waste water installations, biomass-based biogas production plants including biomass 
gasification, CHP or heat production from biomass, geothermal, solar thermal and heat 
expansion for existing waste incineration plants had their own categories, some in all the 
rounds and some only in the later rounds. The rest of the acknowledged technologies, namely 
offshore wind, solar PV, osmosis and free flowing energy had to compete in the free 
category. (NL Agency, 2012) Free flowing energy includes in this case tidal and wave energy 
and energy from water, which is not especially pumped for this purpose and where the drop 
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is under half a meter. Osmosis energy produces electricity by differences in salt 
concentration in two bodies of water, for example when a river flowss to the sea. This 
technology has, however, until now only pilot plants in operation. (NL Enterprise Agency, 
2015b; Kempener & Neumann, 2014) The technologies with own categories and eligibility 
to participate in free category are revised every year. The bidders have to submit as 
prequalification criteria possible required permits (for example water permits) and 
permission of the owner of the planned location. Each round has a deadline until when the 
bids for that round have to be submitted. However, the bids are awarded on a daily basis also 
before the deadline with a “first come, first serve” principle, and in case of exceeding the 
budget by bids arrived on a same day, the lower base price category bids are preferred. This 
means that the price is the only evaluation criterion. (NL Agency, 2012) The winners are 
awarded with the support for 5, 8, 12 or 15 years of operation, depending on the technology 
(NL Enterprise Agency, 2015b). There are also varying realisation time periods for different 
technologies: from 18 months for expansions in existing plants to 5 years for offshore wind 
projects. In case of non-realisation or delay, for projects with a total budget of over 400 
million euros, a penalty of two percent of the project budget is to be paid. (NL Agency, 2012)  
 
Already in the first years of SDE+ scheme, one of the main goals of the scheme, cost 
reduction in renewable subsidies, was achieved. The former SDE scheme needed 80 % more 
budget for the same renewable increase than the SDE+. This is partly caused by the 
competitive nature of SDE+, but also because renewable heating, which is generally cheaper 
than renewable electricity, was included in the newer scheme. The competition led to 
cancellation of the later rounds: in the first year, 2011, almost the whole budget was allocated 
in the first round, and in the second year, 2012, the whole budget was exhausted in the first 
round. (Held et al., 2014) The following years 2014 and 2015 have also been efficient in 
allocating production licenses for a large number and remarkable capacity of renewable 
projects for low costs: in the year 2014, over 4000 bids were received, of which a bit over 
3000 projects were awarded, and in the year 2015, 194 of the 777 bids were successful (NL 
Enterprise Agency, 2015a; Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend, 2015). 
 
As already mentioned, the first Dutch renewable auction round with offshore did not attract 
any small actors. This is, however, not necessarily a sign of a bad auction design, but rather 
a feature of offshore wind projects, as mentioned in subchapter 4.2 Denmark. Therefore, the 
SDE+ tenders are more interesting from the point of view of small actors in Dutch renewable 
auctions. In principle, no actor groups are excluded from the SDE+ auctions. It is also 
mentioned in the calls for tenders that the scheme is aimed not only for companies but also 
for institutions and non-profit organisations. (NL Enterprise Agency, 2015b) The design of 
the tendering system, however, is in no official auction documents stated to be made to suit 
small actors. Quite on the contrary, as already the main goal of the tendering system is to 
achieve the renewable increase at the lowest possible costs, the starting point is not optimal 
for small actors. Indeed, as the auction budget has in many years already been exhausted in 
the early, low-subsidy level rounds, small actors might have had less chances to participate 
economically feasibly than the large companies. (Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend website, 
2016) However, in the Dutch renewable auctions the high competition level and 
achievements in cost reductions seem not have hindered small actors to participate. 
According to Gephart and Kitzing (2016), the percentage of small and medium sized 
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companies taking part to the SDE+ auctions has been in the years 2011 to 2015 between 67 
and 85 %. Moreover, the participation of organisations, communities and other related actors 
has been 11 to 20 % of all the participants. Only very little percentages have been large, 
multinational companies.  
 
On the website of the auctioneer, there are lists of the results and awarded projects available. 
According to those lists, many limited liability companies, which often are relatively large 
actors, have been successful in the auctions. However, the lists include also, depending a bit 
on the year, many anonymous actors. The anonymous ones are stated to be partnerships or 
other forms of enterprises where the individual persons can be easily identified. Those kind 
of enterprises are supposedly (though not stated clearly in the lists) in the most cases small 
actors, and thus, the Dutch SDE+ auctions have not only attracted many small actors to 
participate but also have the small actors been successful. The most of these anonymous 
actors appear in the solar PV category, but some have also been successful in onshore wind, 
solar thermal, biomass and biogas projects. (Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend website, 2016) 
Also a report of Dutch citizen energy cooperatives states the SDE+ scheme to be the main 
support scheme for cooperative solar power projects, even though there are also some other 
means of support that could be taken use of. Until the end of 2015, 3,1 MW of cooperative-
based renewable energy projects were realised with a subsidy allocated from SDE+ auctions. 
(Schwencke, 2016)  
 
The Dutch renewable energy auction system is still relatively young, but has already 
gathered some experiences. It seems that the system is efficient in cost reduction, but there 
are doubts if the country is actually able to achieve the 2020 targets with the least-cost 
method and the SDE+ scheme. (Held et al., 2014) The auction scheme is also not especially 
designed for small actors. However, it seems that also many smaller actors, for example 
cooperatives, are nevertheless able to participate and succeed in the auctions. To conclude 
the most relevant observations from the Dutch renewable auctions from the point of view of 
small actors, a summary is presented in table 7.  
 
Table 7 Summary of the Dutch auction experiences from the point of view of small actors. 
Technologies 
wind onshore and offshore, solar PV, solar thermal, geothermal, 
biomass, hydro 
Small actors 
aimed at all actor groups, not especially designed for small actors but 
to achieve least cost renewable expansion 
Experiences 
surprisingly, the most of the bidders small actors and also many of 
them successful (in solar PV and thermal, onshore wind and 
biomass) 
Main problems in small 
actor participation no identified problems 
Recommendations for 
small actors 
simple design, own price for each technology, no excessive 
prequalification criteria 
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4.5 Brazil 
Brazil is a geographically large country with metropolitan cities and vast areas in the 
Amazon jungle, which are almost untouched by the humans. The geographical diversity and 
size make the electricity system of the country also large and rather complicated. The 
Brazilian power system has always been characterised by the dominance of hydro power: in 
2011, 80 % of the installed electricity production capacity was hydro power plants, and 90 
% of the electricity demand was covered by hydro power. (Rego & Parente, 2013) The hydro 
power plants are spread over the country and have large water reservoirs, which can hold 
water for several years’ hydro power production needs. Thus, the electricity price in Brazil 
is much influenced by the water reservoir levels: in dry years or periods, the electricity prices 
are significantly higher than in years with enough rain. (Mastropietro et al., 2014) The 
Brazilian power system is divided into four submarkets: North, Northeast, 
Southeast/Midwest and South (Moreno et al., 2010). One remarkable feature of the Brazilian 
electricity markets is the dominating position of one company, Electrobras, and its 
subsidiaries. The company was originally founded in the 1960s as a state company to 
develop and operate the Brazilian energy system. Since the unbundling of the system, the 
power of Electrobras has weakened but is still a remarkable and relatively dominating part 
of the energy markets, both in generation and transmission. Because of its size in the 
Brazilian electricity markets and the ownership distribution, where almost half of the shares 
belong to the Government of Brazil, there are concerns about the company’s market power 
in the present, liberalised electricity markets. (Rego & Parente, 2013) 
 
In the past few years, the percentage of hydro power in Brazil has been decreasing 
significantly and the generation is replaced by other, both fossil and renewable, energy 
sources. In year 2014, the hydro power percentage of electricity generation was only 63 %, 
much less than three years earlier in 2011. (Gallo & Lobianco, 2015) As Brazil already had 
a huge share of renewables in its electricity production mix in form of hydro power, it is a 
relevant issue to justify why it is necessary to promote renewable energy in other forms 
further in the country and decrease the importance of hydro power, a simple renewable 
source in Brazilian conditions. When the power system is dependent almost only on hydro 
power, it is also automatically dependent on rainy and dry periods or years. As the tropical 
rains are sometimes hard to forecast, the system adequacy has to be kept stable on conditions 
of the varying water levels and all the other power plants run only when the water reservoirs 
are not full enough. The recent history has shown a few examples of critical situations, where 
the reservoir levels have been too low and the capacity of other power plants has not been 
enough or was near to its limits replacing the hydro power. (Corrêa da Silva et al., 2016) In 
2001, the drought caused a serious lack of hydro power capacity. The other power plants at 
that moment available were not able to back up, and the supply not covering the demand led 
to power rationings of about 20 % for over half a year. (Rego & Parente, 2013) The past few 
years have also experienced exceptionally little rain and the whole country has therefore had 
very dry conditions. Therefore, Brazil has again been going towards electricity crisis when 
the hydro reservoir levels have decreased. In the beginning of 2015, the water reservoir levels 
were lower than in the time of 2001 crisis. This led, however, only to one day of power 
rationing because the power system has been developed towards less dependence on hydro 
power. (Corrêa da Silva et al., 2016) 
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In Brazil, the energy sector liberalisation started in 1993. After almost ten years of 
privatising generation, transmission and distribution units, the 2001 electricity crisis led to a 
re-thinking of the energy reform to better mitigate the problems caused by hydro power 
dependence of rain conditions. The energy reform system was renewed in 2004 and included 
significant changes to the old system. One of the biggest changes to the old system was the 
creation of two electricity market environments, regulated contracting environment for 
small, captive customers and free contracting environment for large, free customers. In the 
free contracting environment, the electricity producers and consumers negotiate bilateral 
energy supply contracts. For the regulated contracting environment, an auction system for 
allocating power plant construction and operation allowances was designed. In the 
renewable energy auction context, Brazil is in a sense of auction goals an exception among 
the other countries analysed in this thesis. When the regular auctions in the energy sector 
started in Brazil in 2004, their purpose was to ensure sufficient electricity supply for the 
growing economy and prevent situation like the rationing in 2001, and they were also applied 
to fossil fuel-based energy production. Thus, the energy auctions have not originally been 
used in Brazil to support renewable energy but to control the amount of electricity produced 
generally. (Rego &Parente, 2013) The first attempt to promote renewable energy, i.e. wind, 
biomass and small hydro power, was a feed-in tariff scheme started in 2002. The 
remuneration was awarded under this scheme in “first come, first serve” principle and not 
on the least-cost basis. The scheme failed in several aspects, for example in reaching its 
expansion goals, incentivising economic efficiency and technological development, and 
created in the end bottlenecks in some project phases of renewable energy projects. Thus, 
the scheme was terminated in 2011 and the auctions became the only remuneration method 
for renewables in Brazil. (Elizondo Azuela & Barroso, 2012; IEA website, 2016a)  
 
In the Brazilian energy auctions, the Chamber for Commercialisation of Electrical Energy 
(CCEE) acts as the auctioneer. The responsibility of estimating the required auction amounts 
is, however, shifted to the distribution utilities who are to buy the electricity produced by the 
successful bidders, i.e. the generators. All the distribution utilities have to estimate before an 
auction round how much power they need to have contracted in the next years and the 
summed amount of all distribution utility needs is auctioned. The auctions are not only used 
to tender new power plants but also to contract the energy produced with already existing 
plants. Thus, the energy auctions in Brazil resemble in that part electricity markets where 
the electricity produced is auctioned and the price for electricity is decided by the market 
situation. To ensure the electricity supply security, the distributors have to have firm energy 
certificates to cover their estimated electricity needs. If the estimated and actual demand do 
not match, the distributors have to pay penalties. This way the system requires accuracy in 
future energy demand estimations and can in an effective way ensure that there is enough 
supply to cover the demand. (de Souza & Legey, 2010) 
 
As mentioned, there are auctions for both new and existing energy. In this system, they 
compete in different auctions and not against each other. Several different kind of auctions 
are organised for varying purposes: so-called A-5 and A-3 auctions for new energy, A-1 
auctions for existing energy, adjustment auctions and auctions for some special projects. The 
A-5 auctions are organised five years before the contracted operation starting time of the 
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power plant. The auctions are especially meant for new hydro power plants, considering the 
required building time of such a plant. The contracts in A-5 auctions are very long-time 
contracts, 30 years. A-3 auctions are, accordingly, held three years before operation 
beginning. They are designed according to thermal power plants’ construction time and the 
contract duration is 15 years. (de Souza & Legey, 2010) Wind energy is an exception with 
the contract duration: it is awarded with 20 year contracts in both A-5 and A-3 auctions. 
Both A-5 and A-3 auctions are held regularly once a year. (David et al., 2013) The objective 
of both of these auctions is to meet future energy demand by adding power production 
capacity. The A-3 auctions have also a function as a possibility for the distributors to correct 
the estimation made in A-5 auctions. On the other hand, the A-1 auctions are intended for 
already existing power plants and organised one year prior to the contract beginning. The 
contracts last five to eight years in A-1 auctions. The purpose of these auctions is to replace 
the energy supply contracts expiring. The adjustment auctions are also designed for existing 
energy, and as the name tells, are purposed on adjusting on shorter term the made 
estimations. The electricity delivery of the adjustment auctions is to start in four months after 
the auction is held and the contracts last three months to two years. Special auctions have 
been held for some particularly large hydro power projects in the Amazon region. (de Souza 
& Legey, 2010) 
 
The auction mechanism is a hybrid model of static and dynamic auctions. The auction has 
two stages, first stage being a descending clock auction round and the second stage a sealed-
bid round. At first, the auctioneer announces a price high enough to attract many bidders 
with more quantity than the actual auctioned quantity. The bidders submit their bids in terms 
of energy they would be able to supply with that price, in average megawatts (i.e. the amount 
of energy produced per year divided by 8760, i.e. the amount of hours in a year). Next, the 
auctioneer lowers the price and the bidders submit their bids again with average megawatt 
amount according to the now announced price. These rounds continue until the bids reach a 
so-called reference offer, which is a beforehand calculated value of bid amount that is still 
higher than the actual auctioned amount and ensures competition for the second, sealed-bid 
stage. In the second and final stage, the bidders qualified from the first stage now have to 
submit their final offer in terms of price. The price cannot be higher than the price of the last 
round of the first stage. The winners are the bids with lowest prices until the auctioned 
amount is covered, and they are awarded with their bid price. This kind of hybrid design 
mitigates the problems of a pure static or a pure dynamic auction: the first stage allows for 
price discovery and reacting to competitors’ behaviour, which in a pure static auction is not 
possible, and the second stage prevents collusive behaviour of the bidders, which is in a 
dynamic auction more likely than in a static one. One purpose of the second stage is also to 
achieve cost reductions through the high competition in prices. (Rego & Parente, 2013) 
 
In theory, all technologies are allowed to take part in all the auctions. However, as mentioned 
before, for example hydro power plants require in the most cases five years’ construction 
time and thus cannot compete in A-3 auctions. In addition, the auctioneer has in some auction 
rounds restricted some technologies, for example oil or coal fired plants, not to be eligible 
to take part, or assigned an auction round only for renewable technologies. (David et al., 
2013) The auction prequalification requirements include a granted environmental license, a 
grid study proving feasible grid connection point for the power plant and a financial 
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guarantee of one percent of the project investment costs. Additionally, if the project is 
successful in the auctions, another financial guarantee of ten percent of the project costs is 
to be deposited after awarding the winners. Both of the financial guarantees are to ensure 
that the projects awarded are actually realised, and in case of project failure or delay, there 
are penalties to be paid or the contract can be terminated in case of a delay of more than one 
year. Wind energy projects have some additional prequalification criteria: the wind turbines 
used have to be new ones and wind measurements at the proposed site have to be conducted 
by an independent party at least for 12 months. (Elizondo Azuela & Barroso, 2012) The 
awarded contracts are allowed to be traded after the auctions. This has created a secondary 
market for the winning bids. (Held et al., 2014) 
 
Brazil has, however, also energy auctions, which do not necessarily follow any of the before 
mentioned rules. In addition to new and existing energy auctions, Brazil organises reserve 
energy auctions as well. These auctions are organised directly by the government. The 
government can call an auction when it considers a need to more reserve energy capacity or 
decides to promote a special energy source. Thus, the reserve energy auctions are not 
organised according to the future energy demand estimates of distribution companies but to 
the decision of the government. These auctions can have varying rules each time, as the 
government can decide the proper rules separately for the specific round. It can also decide 
freely the auctioned amount and the possible technology restrictions. (Maurer & Barroso, 
2011) In practice, however, the reserve energy auctions have been implemented with the 
most of the features of the regular energy auctions (Elizondo Azuela, 2014). The most 
significant difference to the regular auctions is that the contracts signed in reserve energy 
auctions do not have to have firm energy certificates to cover their supply. (Maurer & 
Barroso, 2011) 
 
The first Brazilian auction awarding renewable energy projects other than large hydro power 
plants was held in 2007. Since then, until the end of 2015, altogether 21 auctions for 
renewable energy have been conducted. (IEA website, 2016b) The auctions, where 
renewable energy sources have been competing, have been either regular new energy 
auctions or reserve energy auctions. The auctions have been able to attract many bidders and 
thus create a competitive environment. Especially the onshore wind energy sector has been 
growing fast in Brazil due to the auctions. As there was only very little wind power in Brazil 
before the first auction aimed only for wind projects in 2009, the best and windiest sites were 
still available. Furthermore, wind projects could receive very generous financing conditions 
from the Brazilian national bank and additionally the weak economic situation in Europe 
attracted many international investors to other countries, for example to Brazil. To promote 
wind energy even more, the calculation method of the maximum offered energy of a wind 
turbine was set to an optimistic model instead of the traditionally used ones. High 
competition and good conditions for wind power led to lower prices than expected. (David 
et al., 2013) The average price of wind power decreased in the 2009 auction 45 % of the 
prices under the old feed-in tariff scheme, and during the next two years the prices dropped 
40 % more (Elizondo Azuela et al., 2014). In 2011, wind power competed against 
conventional energy sources in an auction and reached prices lower than the other 
technologies in the auctions (David et al., 2013). Since then, wind energy has been driving 
down the auction prices and generator profits for other technologies in the Brazilian 
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technology-neutral auctions, which is an exceptional situation worldwide (Elizondo Azuela 
et al., 2014).  
 
The high price reductions, however, have raised concerns about projects’ economical 
sustainability and the bidders’ ability to realise the projects. It is stated, for example, that the 
capacity factors in submitted bids are estimated too high and that the actual production will 
stay smaller. As the auction winning prices have been decreasing, the auctioneer has also 
decreased the ceiling price accordingly. In the end of 2013, the ceiling price was already set 
that low that the auction participants could not bid lower than that, resulting the winning 
price to be the ceiling price, thus reducing competition. As the prices received from the 
auctions have dropped that much, the risk of delays in the projects’ realisation increases. 
Indeed, in 2013, as many as 70 % of the projects, which should have had started operation, 
were over one year delayed. However, not only construction problems, possibly caused by 
too low prices, but also transmission network connection problems have been causing 
delays. In fact, 70 % of the delays were caused by grid connection delays. (Elizondo Azuela 
et al., 2014) For example in 2013, 50 wind farms totalling to over 600 MW were ready to 
start operation but missing the grid connection and therefore having delays in commissioning 
(David et al., 2013). Because of these problems, the conditions for wind power projects to 
participate in the auctions were revised in 2013. The calculation of maximum energy offered 
by a wind turbine was set to the conservative, more realistic model. Also the grid connection 
problems were mitigated by transferring more responsibility on the transmission grid 
accessibility to the power plant investors. (Elizondo Azuela et al., 2014) There has also been 
discussions about a better project monitoring system, where the possible delays could be 
identified earlier and the problems related to them decreased (David et al., 2013). 
 
Small actors have been excluded from the Brazilian renewable auctions. Although the costs 
of prequalifying as a bidder by for example environmental licences are not considered to be 
too high for small actors, the financial guarantees required often prevent small or local actors 
from participating in the auctions. (Held et al., 2014) The auction design as a whole is also 
very complex compared internationally (Elizondo Azuela et al., 2014), which does not 
increase the attractiveness of the auctions for small actors. As the competition has been so 
high and prices extremely low, small actors have not had the same possibilities of clever and 
low-bid bidding strategies as large, international actors. Therefore, the small actors do not 
appear in the Brazilian auctions. (Held et al., 2014) 
 
All in all, Brazil is an exception among the other analysed countries in this thesis in many 
senses of renewable energy auctions. The need for the auctions resulted from severe energy 
shortages caused by a dry period in a hydro power dominated country and only later was 
started to apply to promote renewable energy. The auctions have attracted many bidders and 
proven to be very competitive. Also the Brazilian energy mix has become more diverse, 
which was proven in a dry period recently, when the energy shortage was much less severe 
than in the previous dry period. However, the competition in the auctions has been so high 
that the prices have been driven down, even to levels with unsure financial feasibility. This 
has led to a new concern of auctioned capacity not being realised and again leading to 
capacity adequacy problems. At the moment, however, Brazil is continuing auctions for both 
conventional and renewable energy. To conclude the most relevant observations from the 
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Brazilian renewable auctions from the point of view of small actors, a summary is presented 
in table 8.  
 
Table 8 Summary of the Brazilian auction experiences from the point of view of small 
actors. 
Technologies hydro (small and large), biomass, onshore wind 
Small actors no small actors at all 
Experiences realisation and delay problems, network connection problems 
Main problems in small 
actor participation 
no small actors in the markets and not promoted to get new small 
actors, high competition level, strategic underbidding, dominance of 
one company, complex design, high financial guarantees 
Recommendations for 
small actors none 
 
4.6 Overview of the auctioned technologies and actor variety in the 
analysed countries 
To clarify the auction experiences in the five discussed countries and to give an overview of 
them, the technologies auctioned in each country are presented in figure 1. Additionally, the 
figure presents in which countries and technologies small actors have been participating and 
successful and where only large actors have been competing. The auctions have already been 
applied to a wide range of renewable energy technologies in the discussed countries, but 
there are only four of them in which small actors have been participating and successful: 
solar thermal, solar photovoltaic, onshore wind and biomass. The next chapter analyses more 
detailed the features of the discussed auctions and the market structures of the countries and 
concludes the best practices for small actor participation promotion identified in the analysis.  
 
 
Figure 1 Compared countries, auctioned technologies and actor diversity in the auctions. 
The size of the grey dots and ellipses does not represent the number of actors in the 
corresponding actor group.  
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5 Best practice recommendations for small actors in 
renewable energy auctions 
As the literature review of the five analysed countries reveals, the auction design in different 
countries can vary a lot. Because of different designs and energy market structures in the 
five countries, also small actor participation in the auctions vary: some countries have 
implemented auctions specially to facilitate small actor participation and also succeeded with 
that design, whereas some countries have auctions without any small actors participating at 
all. In order to identify the factors enabling small actor participation in the auctions, a 
qualitative comparison between the countries is conducted. First, a short summary of each 
country in sense of small actors in the auctions is presented to have a better overview of the 
main points of the literature review. Then, the elements and features of each country’s 
auctions are compared in detail. Lastly, the identified features are compared with the energy 
market structures of each country.  
 
Germany has traditionally had a large actor variety in the energy sector and with 
implementation of the auctions it also wanted to preserve it. The auctions were designed to 
be as simple as possible not to scare small actors. Also some features were intentionally 
designed in favour of small actors: the flexible financial guarantee and penalty payment 
scheme lessens the auction risks if the actor already has a building plan, thus offering for 
example for small actors the possibility to smaller initial costs and financial risks. Also in 
case of same bid prices, the smaller volumes are preferred, which often gives advantages to 
small actors as they typically create smaller projects. The rules regarding owner and location 
changes prevent large actors to some extent to use their larger portfolios and therefore 
equalise a bit small and large actors’ possibilities in the auctions. The design seems to have 
worked – in the auction rounds held, there has been a large variety of actors participating, 
from private persons to large companies. One factor affecting the actor diversity is also very 
likely the energy market structure in Germany, where also small actors have been 
participating in energy generation and it is thus easier to follow the tradition. The 
competition in the auctions has been high and the winning prices thus rather low. Probably 
because of that, not that many small actors have been successful in those rounds. However, 
some smaller actors have been in the winner category, thus indicating that the German 
auction design combined with its market structure does allow small actors to successfully 
participate in the auctions.  
 
Denmark has auctions only for offshore wind. This technology is by nature characterised by 
large projects realised almost always by large actors. That is the case also in Danish offshore 
wind auctions: only large actors bid for the projects. However, as wind energy is a really 
important energy source for Denmark and to be able to increase its capacity, it is also 
important that it is generally accepted by the people. Therefore, a scheme involving small 
actors in form of local citizens indirectly in the auctions is in use in Denmark. As the project 
realiser has to offer 20 % share of the project to buy to local citizens in case of nearshore 
auctions, the citizens can also benefit from the projects and thus more likely also regard the 
projects more positively. This can, however, not be considered as a true way of including 
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small actors in the auctions but rather as a creative and apparently functioning solution to 
bring large technology projects closer to people.  
 
France has a wide experience with renewable energy auctions. However, only the most 
recent solar photovoltaic auctions have attracted small actors and also allowed them to bid 
successfully. The medium-scale PV auctions are mainly intended for small actors, that is 
private building owners who are willing to install rooftop solar panels. The auction process 
is rather simple, the bids are submitted through an online system and new rounds are 
organised regularly and predictably, which seem to suit well small actors’ needs. The French 
solar PV auctions have, however, clearly proven that the simpler the auction design is the 
better it is for small actors. The required CO2 assessment in the first rounds decreased the 
competition level significantly, thus showing that small actors do not bear any additional or 
complicated procedures to be conducted prior to the auction. If some special criteria are, 
however, required, the rules regarding it should be so clear and simple that also for example 
private persons not specialised in energy technology can understand them and perform the 
process accordingly.  
 
The Netherlands shows a positive example of small actor participation in the auctions. Even 
though the auctions are designed for short-term renewable implementation with as low costs 
as possible and competition has been very high in the past rounds, small actors have been 
actively participating and also been able to win the auctions. The auction design is rather 
simple, as no extensive prequalification criteria are required and ascending clock as the 
auction mechanism is quite easy to understand. As the rounds are organised yearly and the 
bidder only has to submit their bid when the price cap of the round is suitable for them, the 
bidding strategy does not necessarily have to be a sophisticated one. The technology-specific 
price caps are implemented to avoid windfall profits, but can as well be seen to serve as a 
possibility to receive a bit higher prices for some technologies and thus probably also to 
assist small actor participation. The penalty payments system also reduces risk for small 
projects and thus often for small actors, as a penalty due to delay or cancellation is only to 
be paid when the project budget is over a defined limit.  
 
The case of Brazilian renewable energy auctions is the most unsuccessful one of the analysed 
countries in terms of small actor participation, as there are no small actors in the auctions or 
energy markets generally. One reason for that is very likely the market structure, where 
Electrobras with its subsidiaries still dominates and companies trying to compete against it 
have to have very low prices. The auction design itself does not facilitate small actor 
participation either: the system is complex, the financial guarantees required are probably 
too high and the high competition level has led to really low, even unfeasible prices. 
Therefore, large domestic and international companies seize the auctions. Additionally, as 
the transmission system extensions are often delayed and some distribution companies are 
in a poor economic condition, adding risk to energy projects, the Brazilian energy market 
and auctions are even less attractive for small actors.  
 
An extensive comparison between the five analysed countries is conducted in a table in 
Appendix 1. The important observations concluded from the table are analysed in the 
following paragraphs. As the comparison is between five countries, there are some aspects 
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that might not appear in this comparison but might still be noteworthy. Furthermore, in some 
categories no relation between the category and small actor participation is found in this 
comparison. This must not mean that there would not be any relation generally, but no 
relation exists in the comparison of the analysed countries.  
 
Generally, if small actors are taken into account when designing the auctions, it seems that 
the auction also manages to attract them and allow them to be successful, at least to some 
degree. However, a special design according to small actors’ needs seems not to be necessary 
in all cases. Moreover, exception rules for small actors for example in terms of evaluation 
criteria or different auction categories have not been in use in any of the analysed countries 
and thus it can be concluded that they are not always necessary either. Bidder concentration 
rules might set smaller actors in a better position if for example one bidder is not allowed to 
win more than a specific percentage of the auctioned amount. However, these kinds of rules 
are not applied in the analysed countries, so that, either, seems not always to be necessary. 
There were some rules applied for project sizes or minimum number of bidders for the 
auction to be organised, but the implementation of those rules does not seem to have any 
correlation with small actor successfulness. Solar photovoltaic seems to be the most suitable 
technology to be installed and operated by small actors. In the countries where the auctions 
are organised only for solar PV, also small actors are being successful in the auctions. In 
these countries, however, the auctions are also designed to suit small actors. With 
technology-neutral auctions, solar PV technology has the most successful small actors. One 
technology has clearly shown no to be fitting small actors: offshore wind. However, the 
narrow actor diversity in this case is not only a feature of offshore wind auctions but rather 
a general nature of offshore wind projects being large and capital-intensive.  
 
One rule seems to apply to many design elements: the simpler the design, the better it is for 
small actors. It also applies for the general ensemble of the auctions, and it is not always 
enough to design only the separate details simply but to consider also the simplicity of the 
design as a whole. If the bids are to be submitted online, it simplifies the physical procedure 
and thus facilitates the auction attractiveness to small actors. However, an online process is 
not necessary in order to include small actors. The auction mechanism has also an influence 
on the small actor participation. The same rule applies to it, the simpler the mechanism is, 
the easier it is for small actors to participate. When the mechanism is understandable, it 
attracts small actors because they do not have to use as much resources on familiarising with 
the system itself. For example, sealed-bid and ascending clock auctions have in the analysed 
countries proven to be suitable for small actors. In both mechanisms, when presented in a 
simplified manner, the bidder only has to submit the bid and wait for the results. On the 
contrary, for example a hybrid mechanism that is in use in Brazil, requires the bidder to be 
more active in the bidding phase and submit several bid prices after another. That kind of 
design seems to demand more bidding strategy knowledge and acts therefore as a hurdle for 
small actors. 
 
The preparation for the auctions is optimal for small bidders if it is kept to minimum. Rather 
frequent rounds seem to facilitate small actor participation, too, though it is also a feature 
helping all kinds of actors generally. The prequalification criteria should be kept only in few 
criteria and not too investment-intensive, as small actors rarely have high financial liquidity. 
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As some criteria is almost in every auction case necessary to enable a good auction outcome, 
also small actors have to bear some preparation work and costs. It seems that the most 
suitable prequalification criteria to be rather easily fulfilled also by small actors are for 
example environmental or building permits or decision on location. These criteria can be 
summarised as criteria the actor would anyway have to complete at some stage of the project 
realisation in case the project is realised, but do not require high investments. Also some 
well-scaled and especially flexible financial guarantees seem to be bearable for small actors 
as long as they are not too high. On the contrary, high financial guarantees or some additional 
work, for example assessments that a project developer normally does not have to conduct 
when installing a project, seem to be hindering small actors’ interest in the auctions.  
 
The decision between technology banding or technology-neutral auctions did not have much 
effect on small actor participation in this comparison. There were successful small actors in 
auctions banded only for solar photovoltaic but also in technology-neutral auction. In the 
technology-neutral auctions, however, every technology had their own price categories and 
thus also for example small actor friendly solar PV technology could receive high enough 
support levels and probably thus increase the possibilities of small actors to success. Thus, 
it can be concluded, that banding might help small actors but the dependence is not totally 
clear. A clear relation cannot either be found between small actor participation and the 
existence of other support methods at the same time for the same markets. However, if there 
are other support methods, they might create an unintended minimum price for the bids as it 
would make no sense for the bidder to receive a lower price after a laborious auction process 
than what the actor could receive by some other, simpler method. This is especially true for 
small actors, as they do not bear much extra work and they prefer the simpler ways for 
receiving support. Thus, in not only on small actors’ perspective, auctions should be the only 
support method for a target group of technologies or actors.  
 
The relation between small actor interest and auction evaluation criteria seems to be very 
unambiguous: only price as an evaluation criterion suits small actors the best. If there are 
some extra evaluation criteria, it complicates the auction process and its intelligibility and 
lessens its attractiveness from the point of view of small actors. However, there were no 
countries in this comparison, which would have had some main evaluation criteria especially 
designed to increase small actor winning possibilities (except Germany’s small project 
preferring rule in case of same bid prices, which is only a minor scheme in the evaluation). 
Therefore, those kinds of rules cannot be commented based on this comparison. The 
penalties applied on winning projects in case of project delay or failure pose always an 
additional risk to the auction participants. As small actors can tolerate less risks than larger 
actors, the penalties should be kept in minimum in order to attract small actors. International 
experiences show, however, that if no penalties are applied, the project realisation rate tends 
to decrease. Therefore, some penalties are almost always necessary, and thus also to be 
tolerated by small actors. Indeed, small actors seem to cope with the risk of penalties in case 
the penalties are not too high or even better, flexible, thus mitigating the penalty risk.  
 
Quite surprisingly and against many assumptions, small actors have been able to participate 
and be successful also in rather competitive auctions in this comparison. In fact, in both 
Germany and the Netherlands the competition level has been very high and especially in the 
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latter, the main goal of competitiveness and low prices would make one assume no or not 
many successful small actors. However, these countries are exactly the ones among the 
analysed five countries where small actors seem to be able to compete best in the auctions 
against larger actors. The auction winning prices have also been in both countries in rather 
low levels, though not yet unfeasible. One reason for the surprising result might be that the 
competition in both of these auctions seems to be healthy and collusion and strategic bidding 
have been avoided, when not totally, then at least to an extent where it does not distort the 
auction results. Therefore, the prices have been in low but still reasonable and economically 
feasible levels. This has apparently given possibilities for the best and least-cost small actors 
also to successfully participate in these auctions.  
 
The country comparison in terms of important features for small actor participation shows 
some clear relations and good designs to enable small actors to participate in the auctions, 
but also practices that hinder small actor participation and elements with no relation to it. 
However, an auction design functioning in one country and attracting many small actors is 
not necessarily as successful in some other country, especially if the countries and their 
energy market structures are very different. Therefore, it is always important to recognise 
the context of an auction. To better understand the above identified factors, they are 
compared and analysed with the renewable energy market structures of each country of this 
thesis.  
 
As stated many times before, Germany has a history of a large actor variety in renewable 
energy markets. In fact, Germany has the largest number of companies acting in energy 
markets compared to all other European countries, when companies in the fields of 
electricity, district heating and gas are compared. Moreover, two thirds of these companies 
are small and medium enterprises. (BDEW, 2012) Because small actors are a significant part 
of the German energy markets, it is logical that the auctions were also designed to suit them. 
Probably because of a long tradition with small actors in energy markets, no exceptions were 
designed for them in the auctions, and the small actors seem to cope with that as they are 
used to participate in the energy markets. The pilot technology choice of solar PV seems 
also logical, not only because of the before justified reason of quick implementation but also 
because Germany already has a lot of solar energy and it is also one of the most promoted 
technologies for German Energy Transition. Thus, combining these factors, small actor 
tradition and a technology important for the country, the successfulness of the scheme with 
small actors is also rather likely. The high competition level seems also expectable as there 
are so many actors in the German energy markets. Probably one reason for small actor 
successfulness in the competitive auctions, in addition to the reasons identified above in this 
thesis, is their routine in acting in the energy markets and therefore their experience and 
adaptability, also in price reductions.  
 
In Denmark, there are two large companies, who own a significant share of the Danish 
electricity production capacity. There are, however, also smaller actors for example in small-
scale combined heat and power production and small-scale wind power production. (IEA, 
2011) As the auctions are only organised for offshore wind power and also not planned for 
other renewable technologies, only market structure in the offshore wind sector is relevant 
in case of Denmark. Offshore wind market in Denmark has only large actors, as stated 
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before. As the project size and complexity already practically always requires large 
companies in wind energy projects, the auction design itself cannot be blamed for the lack 
of small actors in the offshore wind auctions, and it is therefore not meaningful to analyse 
the before identified, small actor participation enhancing factors in this context.  
 
The French power production sector is strongly dominated by one company, EDF, which 
was the state power producer company before market liberalisation and is still controlled by 
the state. It owns approximately 80 % of the power production capacity. The next 15 % of 
the capacity belong to two large companies, and only 5 % to small or medium sized power 
producers. (Deloitte, 2015a) Because of this market structure, which was before even more 
dominated by EDF, it is rather obvious that the first two auction systems were not designed 
for small actors or that there were none of them participating. In the new medium-scale solar 
PV auctions, the auction design is made especially for small actors as they are the target 
group of that scheme, and therefore in this submarket no exception or bidder concentration 
rules are needed for small actor enhancement. Here it also becomes clear that even when the 
renewable energy market itself is not very small actor friendly, in this case because of the 
dominance of few large companies, it is possible to create a submarket for a specific 
technology, where also small actors are able to compete. Also in this case the small actor 
friendly technology is solar photovoltaic.  
 
The Netherlands has a moderately concentrated power market in terms of market actors. 
There are four large companies, which own altogether 55 % of the installed capacity. 
However, the rest of the capacity owned and power produced is divided between as many as 
about 800 generator enterprises. (Deloitte, 2015b; European Commission, 2014c) Although 
the majority of the Dutch energy production is owned by large companies, the renewable 
energy auctions have attracted mainly only small or medium sized actors. One reason for 
this might be the fossil fuel intensive power production in the Netherlands, where the 
renewable energy business is still rather small, maybe does not thus attract as many large 
actors and is therefore comparatively easy for small actors to attend. As there are generally 
many actors in the Dutch energy markets, this might be one reason for the high competition 
level also in the auctions. Furthermore, because the auctions are basically technology-
neutral, all the energy market actors do compete against each other, increasing the 
competition level. However, the competition seems to be healthy, which also might be 
caused by the large actor number in the Dutch energy markets: there are so many actors that 
for example collusion might be hard to practice in larger or disturbing levels.  
 
As mentioned before, the energy markets of Brazil are characterised by large domestic and 
international companies and the dominance of the former state power company Electrobras 
and its subsidiaries. The power production market does not have small actors, so it is obvious 
that the auctions are by no means designed for small actors. Brazil has also only very little, 
practically an insignificant part of its energy production mix, produced by solar power, 
mostly because of the high costs of the technology (Corrêa da Silva et al., 2016). As solar 
photovoltaic power is identified as a suitable technology also for small actors, one reason 
for the inexistence of small actors in the Brazilian energy markets might also be the lack of 
the fitting renewable energy category generally in the energy markets and also in the 
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auctions. As a conclusion of the Brazilian case, if small actors are not important in the 
markets or for the decision-makers, they do not have many possibilities in the markets.  
 
To conclude this chapter, a table with the most important and relevant factors of the country 
comparison are summed up in table 9.  
 
Table 9 Concluding relevant observations of the country comparison. 
Factor Impact on small actors Market structure impact on the factor 
Suitable 
technologies 
the most suitable: solar PV, 
the most unsuitable: 
offshore wind 
solar PV also auctioned if important for 
the country's energy mix/expansion; 
possible to create solar submarket 
suitable for small actors 
Auction mechanism 
the simpler, the better (e.g. 
sealed bid or ascending 
clock) none identified 
Frequency 
good, but helps also large 
actors none identified 
Online auction good but not necessary none identified 
Prequalification 
criteria 
not too costly but necessary 
licenses OK none identified 
Financial guarantees 
the smaller, the better; 
flexibility helps none identified 
Bidder 
concentration rules 
might help but not 
necessary 
if small actors the only target group, no 
rules required 
Banding might help none identified 
Evaluation method price only none identified 
Penalties 
the smaller, the better; 
flexibility helps none identified 
Competition 
when healthy, then high 
competition OK 
many actors -> no collusion; if small 
actors already before in the markets, 
experience helps also in competition 
Winning prices 
rather low prices still OK 
when not 
strategically/unfeasibly low 
many actors -> no collusion -> 
acceptable prices 
Simplicity the simpler, the better  none identified 
Designed for small 
actors 
attracts small actors but not 
necessary 
only happened in countries with already 
small actors in renewable energy 
markets 
Exceptions for small 
actors not necessary 
when the market already has a tradition 
of small actors, exceptions probably not 
needed 
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6 Experiences in auctions and small actors in other 
industrial sectors 
Renewable energy is not the only sector where auctions have been organised to award 
concession rights. Also in some other sectors, where the resources are limited, it is 
considered efficient to allocate the scarce resources by auctions. Moreover, as the auction 
system is by nature promoting efficiency, which is not the advantage of small actors in many 
cases, auctioneers in many other sectors have also had to consider the problem with small 
actors: should the auction efficiency be the sole objective or is actor variety still in some 
cases more important and should thus be promoted by some special means? This chapter 
gives a short overview of a few auctions in other sectors in terms of small actors and draws 
conclusions that could also be applied to small actors in renewable energy auctions.  
 
In the USA, spectrum auctions have been used to allocate licences for wireless 
communication since 1994. Until 2011, 70 auctions had been organised. (Cramton et al., 
2011) Before the spectrum auctions, the licenses were awarded by comparative hearings or 
lotteries, and the current auctions are stated to be clearly the most efficient method for 
allocating the licenses and that the licenses are given to the actors who the most value them. 
In addition, the U.S. Treasury receives the bid prices as revenues, as the spectrum auctions 
are ordinary and not reverse auctions as renewable energy auctions. (Cramton, 2002) In these 
U.S. spectrum auctions, the auctioneer is obliged to design the auction so that also small 
businesses can participate. The obligation was justified by equity and efficiency reasons: the 
equity for all sizes of businesses should be offered by auction design because small actors 
often naturally have disadvantages, and efficiency could be brought by small actors by 
forcing also larger actors to provide better services with smaller prices and small actors were 
also considered to be more innovative. There have been a few ways to enhance the small 
actor participation in the U.S. spectrum auctions. On some auction rounds, some frequency 
blocks are assigned only for small bidders so that large companies cannot bid in those 
categories. This method is called small business set-asides method. Another method is a 
bidding credit system, where the government offers subsidies for a fixed percentage of the 
small bidders’ winning bids and the small bidders thus do not have to pay the whole bid 
price. For both of these systems, the businesses are classified as small bidders by the annual 
gross revenue and assets of the company. For some later rounds, an additional small actor 
promoting method has been applied: large frequency blocks have been divided into several 
smaller ones, because small businesses can better operate small blocks instead of large ones. 
(Musick, 2005)  
 
The special rules for small actors have not, however, been trouble-free. When the small 
businesses are preferred in the auctions with some exception rules, the licenses are not 
necessarily auctioned to those valuing them the most, and the income received from the 
auctioned licenses is decreased. Furthermore, in some cases, the small businesses that have 
won the auctions have not been able the start to operate the wireless network or have started 
with delay, as larger frequency blocks are hard for small businesses to properly operate. 
Therefore, the network users, companies or private users, have had less access to the 
networks and in some cases they also have paid more for the services. Sometimes it has 
 58 
 
taken years to auction the license for a frequency block again after a failure to operate. 
Additionally, many of the small bidders have sold the licenses auctions to larger businesses 
after the auction, when they have realised that they do not have the financial resources to 
pay for the license and operate it. In theory, there is a penalty to be paid if the license is sold 
in the first five years, but many small businesses have been exempted from the penalty 
payment. This has led to lower small actor share in the license ownership distribution as 
planned. Because of these failures, and although there have also been small bidders dealing 
well with the license operation, the small actor facilitating scheme in case of U.S. spectrum 
auctions has not been very successful. (Musick, 2005) 
 
Japan has used auctions for civil engineering works since 2005. In these auctions, Japan has 
been using a similar method as the USA for the spectrum auctions: set-asides for small and 
medium sized actors. About 60 % of the auction budget has been earmarked to be allocated 
only for small or medium sized businesses in the auctions. In Japan, the small and medium 
sized enterprises are defined by employer number and enterprise capital. (Nakabayashi, 
2013) 
 
In California, highway construction and repair contracts are auctioned. The goal is to allocate 
25 % of the money budgeted for highway procurement to small businesses. To achieve the 
goal, bid preferences are used for small actor participation enhancement. A bid preference 
means that when a bidder categorised as small business bids a defined amount or percentage 
higher than the theoretical winner bidders, the small business is awarded instead of a larger, 
lower bidding actor, against the cost efficiency target of an auction. In Californian highway 
auctions, small businesses are defined so that they have under 100 employees and less than 
ten million dollars of annual revenues. Additionally, the company has to be located in 
California and cannot be a subsidiary of a larger company. The bid preference amount for 
small bidders is either 5 % of the lowest bid of a large company or 50 000 dollars, whichever 
is smaller. (Marion, 2007; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2011) 
 
The experiences from the conducted Californian highway auction rounds show, as there are 
also rounds without the bid preferences for small actors organised, that the rounds with bid 
preferences do attract more small businesses to participate. Also the percentage of successful 
small bidders is higher in the rounds with bid preferences. The experience show, therefore, 
that the program has been able to enhance small actor participation. The goal of 25 % of the 
procurement budget allocated to small businesses is, however, not entirely reached. 
Moreover, because of the small bidder preferences, the cost efficiency of the auctions is 
reduced. (Marion, 2007; Krasnokutskaya & Seim, 2011) 
 
Also in Texas, highway construction contracts are auctioned. These auctions do not have 
direct goals of small businesses as successful bidders but in some of the auction rounds a 
defined percentage of the project has to be conducted by small businesses as subcontractors 
of the actual bidder. In this case, it is not enough that the subcontractor company is small but 
also has to be owned by people from minority groups or by women. The small business 
percentage required as subcontractors is at the most 15 % and varies between the auction 
rounds. Generally, the rule does not apply for small projects auctioned. The scheme seems 
to have functioned not only in promoting small businesses as subcontractors but also in cost 
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efficiency: in the rounds with obligations for small business percentage in subcontractors the 
bids have not been significantly more expensive than in the rounds without the obligations. 
(de Silva et al., 2012) 
 
The few examples from other sectors’ auctions used four different methods for small actor 
participation enhancement: set-asides, bidding credits, bid preferences and obligatory 
percentage of small businesses as subcontractors. The three first of them fall in the category 
of making exception for small actors in order to promote them in the auctions, and the last 
one uses obligations to indirectly involve small actors in projects auctioned. All of those 
methods have one common problem if they would be applied to renewable energy auctions: 
small actor would have to be defined. All of the example auctions of this chapter have 
defined small actors by the employer number and/or financial details of the bidder company. 
In case of renewable energy auctions this could be, however, more complicated, as stated 
already in the chapter 3.1 Definition of a small actor. As many typical small actors in the 
renewable energy context are for example private persons or local cooperatives, who only 
initiate one or very few projects, the financial details of that actor could not be defined. The 
definition could, of course, be conducted by other, in the chapter 3.1 suggested means, but 
the according problems might arise. However, if those problems are overcome and a suitable 
definition of a small actor for a specific market found, all of those four options might be 
considered as small actor promoting methods in renewable energy auctions. No discussed 
auctions from other sectors had any suggestions for general auction design element best 
practices to promote small actors without making special exceptions for small actors. 
Therefore, only the exception schemes and their possible implementation in renewable 
energy auctions are analysed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Set-asides are a relatively simple and understandable method to ensure small actor 
participation in the auctions, and would most likely be that in renewable energy auctions, 
too. Some percentage of the auctioned capacity could be earmarked only for small actors 
even if their bids were higher than some of the large bidders’ bids. Before the 
implementation, it would be important to ensure that there is enough competition for the 
small business earmarked percentage of the capacity. However, similar problems might arise 
as what are described in the USA spectrum auction context. The cost efficiency of the 
auctions would in most of the cases decrease, as higher bids would be preferred. The problem 
of not realised projects would probably be not that acute as in the frequency auction, as the 
frequencies are auctioned as pre-defined blocks, which might sometimes be too large for 
small actors, but in the most cases of renewable energy auctions the project size is rather 
freely to be decided by the bidder. Therefore, small bidders in renewable energy auctions 
would most likely initiate projects of a suitable size for them to operate. Selling the project 
after the auction to a larger bidder could also happen in renewable energy auctions. 
Therefore, a high enough penalty for selling the project should be implemented and exempts 
to that penalty given only with well justified reasons. However, set-aside rules do affect the 
market situation artificially and might distort the market and competition, especially in a 
longer timeframe.  
 
Bidding credits could not be implemented in the same form in renewable energy auctions as 
how they are in use in spectrum auctions, because renewable energy auctions are reverse 
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auctions. They could probably be implemented in renewable energy auctions so that the 
bidder, in case of being awarded as winner, would receive higher price than the bid and/or 
winner price. The extra price would, however, have to be really carefully scaled to avoid 
windfall profits in case of too high extra price. If designed this way, the scheme would 
actually resemble a lot the bid preference scheme. In the bid preference scheme, small 
bidders’ bids would be considered a defined amount lower than what they actually are when 
awarding the bids. From a bidder strategy point of view, this would lead to same decisions 
of a bidder when bidding as in the proposed bidding credit system in renewable energy 
auctions. The scheme of bidding credits or bid preferences would most likely attract more 
small actors than an auction design without such schemes, as the chance of winning would 
be higher. All the problems of the previous paragraph could, of course, appear also when 
implementing bidding credits or bid preferences. They would most likely also have an 
impact on the competition. It is, however, impossible to say if the impact would be positive 
with more small bidders or negative with fewer large bidders.  
 
The scheme with a specific percentage of small businesses as subcontractors could also 
probably be implemented in renewable energy auctions. This would, however, not increase 
the small actor participation in actual energy markets but in for example power plant parts 
producing facilities, transportation companies and so on. In highway construction contracts 
the situation is different, as the contact is only made for the construction of a few months’ 
duration, and for that also subcontractors work in the actual, targeted field of road 
constructing. In renewable energy contacts the main weight is in addition to the power plant 
building also on the operation of the plant. As the scope of this thesis is to analyse small 
actors particularly in the renewable energy production sector, this scheme does not seem 
very relevant to analyse further in this context. It could, however, be an efficient scheme to 
promote small actors in the renewable energy sector in a larger perspective.  
 
As the all examples of small actor promoting schemes in this chapter include exceptions 
created for small actors, this chapter supplements well the comparison of the five countries 
with renewable energy auctions analysed in the previous chapters. None of those countries 
had implemented any methods for small actor participation enhancement which would give 
some exception for small actors, when they participate in the auctions. As can be concluded 
from this chapter’s short overview, exception rules for small actors are in use in some 
auctions and can be functioning. However, when implementing the exception rules, the 
definition of a small actor has to be considered carefully and the actual scheme has to be 
well thought-through to fit the specific market situation. Monitoring of the successfulness of 
the scheme also has to be conducted thoroughly to avoid misuse of the special rules and the 
small actor status.  
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7 Conclusions 
Auctions are becoming all the time more popular as the support method for renewable 
energy. The advantage of this method over the other traditional support methods is its ability 
to reduce the costs of renewable support to the society. To ensure that the auctions function 
in a proper and planned manner, they have to be designed carefully to suit the specific market 
situation and the goals of a country.  
 
As auctions are a competitive procedure and the price of the bids usually defines, at least 
partially, the winners, the bidders with lowest prices have the largest advantages in the 
auctions and possibilities to win. Typically, large actors can use their wide portfolios, create 
larger projects and take the advantage of economies-of scale effect to lower their bid prices. 
On the contrary, small actors normally create smaller, fewer and more specific kind of 
projects and cannot thus benefit from those features. Therefore, if a country wants to have 
also small actors participating and winning in the renewable energy auctions, in many cases 
it has to be taken into account already when designing the auctions. The decision if small 
actors are to be promoted in the auctions is often a compromise between cost efficiency and 
actor diversity in the auctions or renewable energy markets generally. Actor diversity and 
many small actors in the auctions bring a variety of benefits: higher social acceptability, 
deployment of the widest possible renewable energy mix and project distribution, lower 
electricity grid congestion issues and decreased collusion by more actors competing in the 
auctions. However, if these factors are preferred over an absolute cost efficiency, the basic 
rule of the auctions of reducing support costs to the minimum is violated. Therefore, it is 
important for the decision-makers to consider the advantages and disadvantages of both 
options carefully when implementing the auctions.  
 
The optimal design for small actor participation enhancement is not an easy task and there 
is no design that would fit all the market situations and countries. Therefore, this thesis 
analysed five countries, which had implemented renewable energy auctions, and compared 
their experiences with small actors in the auctions. The comparison identified some common 
features in those countries and based on those, conclusions can be drawn for small actor 
promoting design of an auction. Solar photovoltaic seems to be the most suitable technology 
for small actors in the auctions. Therefore, if a country would like to have more small actors 
in the renewable energy auctions, it could be recommended to start to experiment a proper 
design with auctions for solar PV. Generally, the auction design is to be as simple as possible 
to attract small actors, as they cannot bear extra hurdles, risks and costs as easily as larger 
actors can. The auction mechanism should be easily understandable and not require 
complicated bidding strategies. For example, sealed bid and ascending clock auctions have 
been functioning as a suitable auction mechanism for small actors. The prequalification 
criteria should be well scaled and not require too much work and costs prior to the auction. 
Small actors seem to handle as prequalification criteria for example getting some obligatory 
licenses they would anyway have to have when realising a project. Also small and in the best 
case flexible financial guarantees are tolerated by small actors, as long as a large amount of 
money does not have to be deposited before the auction. The evaluation criteria should also 
be as understandable as possible not to deter small actors. Price-only evaluation seems to be 
the best option among the compared countries when promoting small actors in the auctions. 
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However, prior evaluation criteria preferring especially small actors was not in use in the 
analysed countries, so no conclusions can be drawn of the functioning of that kind of criteria. 
Penalties are always an additional risk to the bidders, and as the risks are proportionally 
larger for smaller actors, the penalties should be kept, like the financial guarantees, small 
and flexible.  
 
One rather surprising conclusion resulted from the country comparison: against many 
assumptions, small actors have been participating and successful also in auctions with high 
competition level. This might indicate that small actors are, after all, not as disadvantaged in 
the renewable energy auctions as sometimes thought. The competition, however, has been 
in these auctions healthy and not collusive. Thus, the winning prices have also stayed in 
proper, feasible levels enabling more possibilities for the most cost-efficient small actors. 
Therefore, it is important to ensure healthy competition, where no collusion, underbidding 
or strategic bidding happen, in order to attract small actors and give them a real possibility 
to win.  
 
In the analysed countries, there were no exception rules in use for small actors. However, 
the short overview of auctions in some other sectors provided experiences for this aspect, as 
well. The identified exception rules for small actors were set-asides, bidding credits, bid 
preferences and obligatory percentages of small actors as subcontractors. The first three of 
the rules could also be working in renewable energy auctions enhancing the small actors in 
energy production. The rules would give small actors a special status, thus requiring a strict 
definition of a small actor. They would, most likely, attract small actors in the auctions and 
offer them better possibilities to bid successfully. However, the costs of the support scheme 
would most likely increase. One could also argue that free competition is restricted when an 
actor group receives a special treatment. However, in some extreme cases where it is 
otherwise really hard for small actors to participate or to be successful in the renewable 
energy auctions, exception rules could be a possibility to mitigate the problems and design 
the auctions better suitable for small actors. When exception rules are applied, they have to 
be designed carefully to avoid misuse and other possible problems.  
 
As can be seen, there are several elements, which with a specific design could mitigate 
problems for small actors in the auctions and facilitate their participation and successfulness. 
The auction design as a whole is a challenging task with trade-offs between different benefits 
and disadvantages of the specific design of each design element. Therefore, the small actor 
participation enhancement is only one of the possible goals of an auction, and the design 
cannot thus be solely designed aiming only to this target. The features identified in this thesis 
for small actor promotion are, however, possible to implement also when a variety of other 
goals are set for the auctions. The trade-offs have to be considered carefully and in many 
cases also experimented empirically by pilot auctions to iterate the best possible auction 
design to facilitate the goals set for the auctions, the current market situation and the 
renewable energy targets of a country. 
 
The recommendations of this thesis should, however, be considered properly with the current 
market situation. As only five countries were analysed, this thesis has some limitations in its 
applicability. The five countries give only a narrow review of the diverse practices and 
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markets in the countries with renewable energy auctions in the world. The analysis is by no 
means complete and comprehensive, but only a first iteration of a possible wider research of 
more empirical examples and their experiences. There are many design elements, where no 
relation to small actor participation was found in this thesis, but this does not necessarily 
mean that there would not be any relation between them in any markets. Also some relations 
identified might be different when applied to completely different market structure contexts. 
Moreover, the experiences in some of the analysed countries are not yet long enough to be 
able to draw final conclusions on the functionality of the specific designs.  
 
Therefore, there are many directions the research could be continued in possible future 
works. When the analysis is extended to more countries, the perspective can be widened and 
applied as more comprehensive. To be able to gather more reliable information for some 
countries, several years would have to be waited in order to complete more auction rounds 
and give the projects time to be in operation. This way the successfulness of an auction 
design can be judged more reliably. One interesting direction of further research would also 
be to involve the small actors themselves in the study and by interviewing gather their 
opinions and experiences. This information could be applied to a research conducted from 
the actors’ point of view, not from the regulator or decision-maker’s point of view of auction 
design.  
 
All in all, the renewable energy auctions are a hot topic in the near future in climate change 
mitigation in the energy production sector. It remains to be seen, how effective they prove 
to be in renewable energy deployment and cost reductions of renewable energy support. The 
involvement of small actors in the auctions arises often when designing the auctions and it 
has to be decided in every country individually, if that will also be one goal of the auctions.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1. Country comparison: Different factors’ impact on 
small actors 
  Important RE 
RE percentage 
2014 RE goal Market structure 
Political 
stability 
Germany 
solar, wind, 
(hydro 
biomass, 
geothermal) 
32,5 % of 
electricity 
demand 
2025: 40-45 %,  
2035: 55-60 %,  
2050: 80 % of 
electricity demand 
large actor 
diversity, many 
players 
good, RE-
committed 
country 
Denmark 
wind, 
biomass, 
(solar, hydro, 
biogas) 
53,4 % of 
electricity 
demand,  
28,5 % of 
energy demand 
2020: 35 % of energy & 
50 % wind of electricity 
demand, 2035: 100 % 
of electricity & heat 
demand, 2050: 100 % 
of energy demand 
only large 
domestic & 
international 
actors in offshore 
wind markets 
OK, at the 
moment RE 
friendly 
government 
France 
EOLE         
OK, though the 
system changed 
often 
France 
PPI         
OK, though the 
system changed 
often 
France 
PV 
hydro, wind, 
solar, biomass 
19,5 % of 
electricity 
demand 
2020: 23 % of energy 
demand & 27 % of 
electricity demand, 
2030: 32 % & 40 % 
respectively 
one company 
(EDF) dominates, 
but also small 
actors 
OK, though the 
system changed 
often 
The NL 
SDE           
The NL 
SDE+ 
"all", 
especially the 
cheapest 
ones 
2011: 4,3 % of 
energy 
demand, 2013: 
9 % of installed 
capacity 
2020: 14 % of energy 
demand 
4 companies 
dominate (55 %), 
altogether ca. 800 
generator 
companies 
many changes, 
current policy 
only until 2020 
Brazil 
hydro, wind, 
biomass 
hydro 63 % of 
electricity 
demand   
dominance of 
Electrobras & its 
subsidiaries, large 
companies 
RE policy OK, 
otherwise 
sometimes 
unstable 
Impact 
on small 
actors no relation no relation no relation 
when already 
small actors in the 
market, easier for 
the auctions to 
attract them 
stability good, 
but when not 
too unstable, 
small instability 
still OK  
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Auctioned 
technologies 
Previous 
support 
system Mechanism Product Quantity Frequency 
Germany 
ground-mounted 
solar PV (2017-> all 
RE technologies) 
generous 
feed-in tariff 
sealed-bid, 
pay-as-bid 
(2nd & 3rd 
round 
uniform price) capacity 
100-200 MW 
/round 3 x/year 
Denmark offshore wind feed-in tariff 
single-item, 
pay-as-bid, 
sometimes 
negotiations 
(nearshore 
multi-item) capacity 
200-600 MW 
/project, 
nearshore  
305 MW 
when 
needed 
France 
EOLE wind none   capacity 
altogether 
361 MW (51 
projects)   
France PPI 
onshore & offshore 
wind, biomass, 
solar EOLE pay-as-bid capacity 
depends on 
the round 
when 
needed 
France PV solar PV PPI pay-as-bid capacity 30-120 MW 2-6 x/year 
The NL 
SDE offshore wind feed-in tariff     950 MW only once 
The NL 
SDE+ 
all + renewable 
heat & biogas SDE 
ascending 
clock with 5 
rounds volume 
until the 
yearly budget 
exhausted 
1 x/year 
with 5 in-
auction 
rounds 
Brazil 
hydro (small and 
large), wind, 
biomass feed-in tariff 
hybrid: 1st 
stage 
descending 
clock, 2nd 
stage sealed-
bid pay-as-bid average MW 
amount 
estimated by 
distribution 
companies 
A-5 & A-3 
yearly, 
others when 
needed 
Impact on 
small 
actors 
solar PV good 
(when only solar PV 
auctions, there are 
many small actors, 
when technology-
neutral auctions, 
the most small 
actors in solar PV), 
offshore wind not 
suitable no relation 
The simpler, 
the better 
(e.g. sealed-
bid pay-as-bid 
& uniform 
price, 
ascending 
clock) no relation no relation often good 
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Predictability
/ regularity 
Contract 
duration Online Prequalification criteria 
Bidder 
concentra-
tion rules Price limits 
Germany very good 20 years no 
location, decision on building 
plan/decision on 
publication/approved 
building plan, 1st deposit 4/2 
€/kWh, 2nd deposit 50/25 
€/kWh 
project size 
min. 100 
kW, max 10 
MW 
price cap 
1st round 
11,49 
c/kWh, next 
rounds 
lower 
Denmark 
not regular 
but 
announced 
well ahead of 
time 
50 000 full 
load hours 
(~12-15 
years)   
not > 100 000 DKK debt,  
1st & 2nd round: documents 
on financial situation & 
former projects,  
5th & 6th round: turnover > 
15 billion DKK, documents on 
former projects and turbine 
& foundation facts, 
nearshore: turnover > 4 
billion DKK, documents on 
former projects none 
price cap 
nearshore: 
70 øre/kWh 
France 
EOLE             
France PPI   
20 years 
normally 
depends 
on the 
round 
fuel supply contract, grid 
connection & other possible 
studies, site 
ownership/rental contract 
if too few 
participants
, may be 
cancelled   
France PV good 20 years yes 
bidder owner of the building, 
CO2 assessment, recycling 
plan 
if too few 
participants
, may be 
cancelled none 
The NL 
SDE   15 years   
water permit, distance to 
shore, timetable, financial 
calculations     
The NL 
SDE+ very good 
technolog
y-specific: 
5/8/12/15 
years yes 
required permits, site owner 
permission none 
technology-
specific 
Brazil OK 
hydro 30, 
wind 20, 
biomass 
15 years yes 
environmental license, grid 
connection study, 1st deposit 
1% of budget, 2nd deposit 
10% of budget, extra for 
wind: new turbines, >12 
months wind measurements none 
1st stage: 
auctioneer 
sets,  
2nd stage: 
price from 
1st stage 
Impact on 
small 
actors 
predictability 
good, though 
only 
predictability 
does not 
ensure small 
actors 
no 
relation 
online 
process 
helps 
but not 
necessa-
ry 
the fewer the better, simple 
criteria and low/flexible 
deposits OK, permits etc. 
which are anyway needed 
OK, "extra" work not good 
surprisingly 
no relation 
no relation 
(though in 
no country 
very low 
caps) 
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  Banding 
Geo-
graphical 
restrictions Evaluation criteria Deadlines Penalties 
Ger-
many only PV 
rules on 
what kind of 
area to 
install PV 
but no 
regional 
rules 
price (when many same 
prices, smaller project 
win) 18 months 
< 6 months delay/location 
change: -0,3 c/kWh,  
> 6 months delay: 
contract cancelled, 50/25 
€/kWh payment,  
own cancellation: 4/2 
€/kWh payment 
Den-
mark 
only 
offshore 
wind 
predefined 
sites 
price,  
1st and 2nd round: e.g. 
project timetable yes 
1st, 2nd & 3rd round: 
none, 4th round: support 
reduction if delay with 1st 
turbine, payment if delay 
with last turbine, 5th & 
6th round: payment if 
building delay, support 
reduction if connection 
delay, nearshore: support 
reduction if connection 
delay, payment if 
cancellation 
France 
EOLE only wind 
regional 
diversity 
considered 
when 
awarding 
price, economic & long 
term benefits, technical 
& financial reliability, 
environmental issues, 
local authorities' opinion      
France 
PPI 
all technolo-
gies have 
own 
auctions 
regionality 
defined to 
some extent 
price, in some rounds 
similar criteria as in 
EOLE 
depends on 
the 
technology 
support period reduction 
or payment 
France 
PV only PV none 
few first rounds:  
66 % price, 33 % CO2 
assessment, later price 18 months 
support period reduction 
if delayed 
The NL 
SDE 
only 
offshore 
wind none price 5 years 
20 million € payment if 
delayed/cancelled 
The NL 
SDE+ 
no (but 
every 
technology 
own prices) none price 
technology-
specific: 18 
months to 5 
years 
payment of 2 % of budget 
if delayed/cancelled and if 
budget > 400 million € 
Brazil 
depends on 
the round none last (2nd) stage: price 
auction type 
specific: 4 
months or 1, 
3 or 5 years 
contract cancelled if delay 
> 1 year,  
payment if cancellation 
Impact 
on small 
actors 
to some 
degree 
helps, but 
not 
necessary no relation 
price only good (though 
no countries with small 
actors preferring 
criteria) no relation 
flexible penalty system 
good 
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Secondary 
market Competition level Winning prices 
Realisation 
rate 
Simple/ 
complex design 
Germany none 
high (15-35 % of 
the bids awarded) 
1st round: 8,48-9,43 
c/kWh,  
2nd: 8,49 c/kWh,  
3rd: 8,00 c/kWh  
(2nd & 3rd round also 
very low bids) not available rather simple 
Denmark none 
middle to low, 1-4 
bidders/ round 
1st round: 6,9 c/kWh, 
2nd: 6,7 c/kWh,  
3th: 8,5 c/kWh,  
4th: 14,1 c/kWh,  
5th: 10,3 c/kWh 
2nd round 
project not 
realised 
depends on the 
round 
France EOLE none   
1st round: 5,2 ECU 
c/kWh 
very low: 20 % 
(70 MW)   
France PPI none 
depends on the 
round, very high to 
very low 
biomass 2007: 12,81 
c/kWh, 2009: 4,5 
c/kWh,  
offshore wind 2011: 22 
c/kWh, 2013: 20 c/kWh 
depends on the 
round, poor to 
good 
depends on the 
round 
France PV none 
1st round low 
because of CO2 
assessment 
2012 highest: 23,2 
c/kWh, 
2013 lowest: 15,3 
c/kWh   
simple (after 
CO2 assessment 
was left away) 
The NL SDE none good   
only 600 MW 
awarded 
because of lack 
in budget   
The NL SDE+ none 
very high (budget 
exhausted in the 
first rounds yearly) 
the predefined price 
caps   rather simple 
Brazil yes very high 
very low prices, wind in 
the recent years even 
lower than 
conventional energy 
low, many 
delays: in 2013 
70% delayed > 
1 year complex 
Impact on 
small actors 
no 
relation 
surprisingly, also in 
high competition 
successful small 
actors when not 
too much 
collusion/ strategic 
bidding 
also in relatively low 
prices successful 
not enough 
data 
the simpler the 
better 
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Designed for 
small actors Exceptions for small actors 
Other support at the 
same time Grid issues 
Germany also 
no (Germany follows the 
situation if exceptions 
needed) no no 
Denmark no no 
feed-in tariff (same 
amount as for 
onshore wind) no 
France EOLE no no no no 
France PPI no no 
feed-in tariff main 
support, auctions 
complementary no 
France PV yes no no no 
The NL SDE no no no no 
The NL SDE+ also no 
minor tax incentive 
schemes for non-SDE+ 
projects no 
Brazil no no no 
yes: connection 
often delayed 
Impact on 
small actors 
if specially 
designed, seems 
to work, but does 
not have to be 
designed keeping 
in mind small 
actors 
not in use in any of the 
countries, still successful 
small actors 
better when no other 
main support 
methods no relation 
 
